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ABSTRACT 
Education policy is frequently in the crosshairs of ideological disagreement.  This 
dissertation analyzes three controversial policies over which elected school boards often 
have control: charter schools, suspension bans, and ability groups. 
How do charter schools impact district academic growth?  Researchers typically 
focus on large districts with many charter schools, but the most common experience is an 
average-sized district shifting from no charters to one.  A difference-in-differences design 
analyzing a decade of charter expansion in California reveals that impact is contingent on 
charter type: locally funded charters (i.e. affiliated with the district) lead to either static or 
decreased growth while directly funded charters (i.e. independent of the district) lead to 
higher academic growth. 
Many policymakers have banned or limited suspensions for all but the most 
serious offenses.  The 2013 suspension ban in Los Angeles Unified School District 
provides a natural experiment; it led to a substantial, 0.2 standard deviation decrease in 
academic growth among middle schools that had previously issued the banned 
suspensions.  Four subsequent suspension bans – in San Francisco, Pasadena, Oakland, 
  viii 
and (grades K-3) all of California – also appear to have harmed academic growth.  
Simultaneously, suspension bans have an uncertain relationship with dropout rates, the 
primary mechanism by which bans are meant to impact the school-to-prison pipeline.  
Instead of banning suspensions, policymakers should carefully test other efforts that 
decrease suspension and dropout rates without harming academic growth. 
Finally, educators have utilized between-class ability grouping – sorting students 
in one grade into different classes by prior ability – for over a century.  Proponents rely 
on a previously untested mechanism: decreased classroom dispersion in prior academic 
ability allows teachers to target their instruction more narrowly.  This final paper 
measures classroom dispersion directly for the same students over four trimesters.  
Multivariate regressions and multilevel models evaluate the relationship between 
classroom dispersion and academic growth while controlling for other classroom 
characteristics as well as student, teacher, and school effects.  Analyses reveal that 
English classrooms with less dispersion in prior ability experience slightly less growth.  
However, there is a trade-off: between-class ability grouping improves equity at the 
expense of overall academic growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
This dissertation analyses the academic impact of three controversial education 
policies.  Increased academic growth would greatly enhance economic development 
(Hanushek et al. 2015) and reduce the disparity in achievement that exists between racial 
groups (e.g. Harris and Herington 2006) and income brackets (e.g. Reardon 2013).  While 
many people – such as parents (Galindo and Sheldon 2012), teachers (Kane et al. 2013), 
and superintendents (Whitehurst et al. 2014) – influence academic growth, school board 
members have unique levers of control over relatively large numbers of students.  Of all 
institutional variance in student scores (i.e. differences explained by teachers, schools, 
and districts), school districts account for 10% of academic performance (Whitehurst et 
al. 2013 and 2015). 
Each chapter highlights a specific way school boards can impact academic 
growth:  
1. Districts experience static or decreased academic growth after the first locally 
funded charter opens, but increased growth after the first directly funded charter 
school opens. 
2. An effort to reduce suspensions by Los Angeles Unified School District 
(LAUSD) caused a substantial decrease in academic growth for many of its 
middle schools. 
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3. A charter school organization’s decision to sort students into English classes by 
their ability slightly depressed overall academic growth, but it increased growth 
for the lowest-achieving students. 
There are two overall messages.  The first is that specific decisions that school boards 
make can have enormous impact – positive or negative – on academic growth.  The 
second message, unfortunately, is that school boards operate in an environment much 
more influenced by ideology than by evidence.  Even when extant research can provide 
guidance, school boards make limited and selective use of this information (Asen et al. 
2013; Penuel et al. 2017).  More importantly, school boards rarely oversee research 
necessary to evaluate the impact of their specific efforts.  In the struggle between 
ideology and information, this dissertation attempts to push the balance slightly more 
toward rigorous evidence. 
The Research Question 
How do school boards impact academic growth?  While it is beyond the scope of 
one dissertation to analyze every way school boards can make an impact, the three papers 
each analyze a distinct type of action school boards can take.  It is important to explain 
the focus on school boards as well as the specific outcome of academic growth.1 
Understanding how to improve academic growth is important for both economic 
growth and social justice.  An analysis for the National Bureau of Economic Research 
analyzing the impact of student achievement on economic growth for U.S. states finds 
                                                        
1 These papers will all use standardized test score gains to operationalize academic growth.  Standardized 
tests are imperfect measures of student learning, and they are subject to distortions that threaten the validity 
of the findings in these papers.  However, standardized tests are the only widely available measure of 
academic growth that we have, and education researchers routinely use them in their work. 
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“enormous scope for state economic development through improving the quality of 
schools” (Hanushek et al. 2015).  Since the publication of the Coleman Report “Equality 
of Educational Opportunity” in 1966, scholars have noted large disparities in academic 
achievement between racial groups and income brackets.  In additional to being intrinsic 
issues of social justice, these disparities fuel income inequality, which is known to harm 
economic growth (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015) and trust (d' Hombres et al. 2013). 
Why focus on school boards?  While many actors influence academic growth, the 
role of school boards is a uniquely powerful combination of scope and depth.  Those who 
may have a stronger impact, such as parents and teachers, influence far fewer numbers of 
students.  State and national policy-makers influence many more students, but in much 
less direct ways.  Local school boards possess specific authority over a wide range of 
educational matters that can dramatically impact the students they serve.  A small but 
growing literature on local school board members finds that their racial diversity (Hughes 
et al. 2017), quality of interaction (Grissom 2012), and attitudes (Lorentzen 2013) 
influence student outcomes.  The implication is that particular actions school boards take 
can impact academic growth. 
Nevertheless, positively influencing school board behavior will take creativity.  
Even when they are inclined to make decisions informed by evidence, school board 
members operate in environments where research tends to be used to support decisions 
that have already been made (Asen et al. 2013; Penuel et al. 2017).  Disseminating 
information about district performance does not impact reelection prospects or even 
superintendent turnover (Kogan et al. 2016a).  The only effect of a very clear signal of 
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district underperformance – “failing AYP” (Academic Yearly Progress) in former federal 
accountability parlance – was that voters became less likely to approve education-related 
tax via referendum (Kogan et al. 2016b).  Unfortunately, such direct democracy tends to 
result in less instructional spending, more teacher turnover, and decreased academic 
growth (Kogan et al. 2017).  Education researchers should think carefully about the 
linkages between important findings and improved outcomes. 
Three Chapters 
This dissertation takes the form of three chapters.  One analyzes how academic 
growth changes for districts after the first charter school opens within its boundaries.  
Another chapter evaluates the impact of a policy that suddenly reduced the number of 
suspensions in many Los Angeles schools.  The final chapter estimates the effectiveness 
of sorting students into English classes based on their prior achievement.  I choose these 
particular topics for three reasons.  
First, each of the topics concern potential school board actions.  Charter schools 
can open in nearly every US state, and school boards can encourage these schools to open 
within their borders if not authorize them directly.  As for suspensions, school boards can 
take actions that go beyond statewide regulations, often at the behest of interest groups.  
Lastly, school boards can at least recommend the practice (or not) of sorting students by 
ability even when they cannot require that schools do so. 
Second, each chapter makes a theoretical contribution to its respective literature.  
Research on the impact of charter schools typically focuses on a few large school districts 
containing many charter schools.  In contrast, the first chapter of this dissertation 
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analyzes the far more common experience of the first charter school opening in a (usually 
average-sized) district.  This chapter also highlights a previously overlooked distinction 
between two types of charter schools: those that are affiliated with their local school 
district, and those that operate independently.  Only the latter type of charter school 
appears to cause increased growth for local school districts, suggesting that districts only 
improve if they feel competitive pressure from charter schools. 
The school discipline literature contains two competing hypotheses about the 
expected impact of a suspension ban on schoolwide academic growth.  The second 
chapter of this dissertation tests those hypotheses for the first five large-scale suspension 
bans in the United States.  The ban appears to harm growth in every case.  The results 
suggest that at least some suspensions might be better conceptualized as a symptom of 
other problems instead of as an independent cause of negative outcomes.  Such a 
conceptualization would explain how trying to directly reduce suspensions (a symptom) 
fails to lead to positive outcomes. 
The literature on between-class ability groups spans nearly a century.  However, it 
never directly tests the primary mechanism that causes this grouping practice to impact 
academic growth: students in classrooms have less dispersion in their prior academic 
ability.  In theory, less dispersion would enable teachers to target their instruction more 
narrowly and accurately for all students.  The final chapter of this dissertation tests this 
classroom dispersion mechanism directly and finds that less dispersion typically leads to 
less academic growth.  This is the opposite result of recent scholarship, and it suggests 
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that the results of between-class ability grouping may be dependent on factors such as 
curricular design and teacher training. 
Third, each chapter uses a research methodology that produces more rigorous 
evidence than most of the existing literature.  The charter school chapter alleviates 
concerns of omitted variable bias through two innovative analyses.  The first looks at 
school districts where the first directly funded charter school was denied by the local 
school board but then approved on appeal to the county or state.  The fact that these 
districts also increased their academic growth proves that the finding is not caused by 
district willingness to open a charter school.  The second analysis compares directly 
funded and locally funded charters and finds that only directly funded ones cause an 
increase in district academic growth.  This means that having a community that can 
produce a successful charter petition is insufficient to cause district growth; the charter 
school also needs to have independence. 
The literature on behavior management uses non-experimental methods to argue 
that suspensions depress academic performance, both for suspended students and their 
non-suspended peers.  The second chapter exploits a policy shift in the second largest US 
school district to argue that this is probably not true; LAUSD middle schools experienced 
a huge drop in academic growth after the school board banned suspensions based on 
defiance.  This is based on a natural experiment within LAUSD.  LAUSD schools that 
gave no defiance suspensions prior to the suspension ban are very similar 
demographically to LAUSD schools that gave a few or many defiance suspensions.  
However, schools that gave no defiance suspensions prior to the ban saw no reduction in 
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their academic growth, while other LAUSD schools experienced a substantial reduction. 
This chapter also relies on difference-in-differences analyses that compare LAUSD to the 
rest of California.  While other researchers have used difference-in-differences, they had 
to utilize natural fluctuations in suspension rates, which opens the possibility of omitted 
variable bias (Perry and Morris 2013).  This chapter does not suffer from those same 
concerns because suspension bans are the result of a sudden, forced drop in suspension 
rates. 
Finally, the ability grouping literature typically relies on standard OLS (ordinary 
least squares) regression of cross-sectional student data.  In contrast, the third dissertation 
chapter utilizes multilevel analyses to more accurately model the nested structure of the 
data: students within grades within teachers within schools.  Additionally, having four 
trimesters of data for the same students allows for a test that includes student controls.  
This test finds that as the same student moves from a less dispersed to a more dispersed 
classroom, that students tends to experience slightly higher academic growth.  These 
methodological advances provide a rationale to trust the surprising findings. 
All three chapters concern a school board policy, make theoretical contributions, 
and push the methodological rigor of their respective literatures.  In addition, each 
chapter also demonstrates a distinct way that researchers can help improve outcomes for 
students.  The chapter on charter competition demonstrates that school boards do not 
always make decisions in the best interest of student academic growth.  This suggests a 
need to lobby state policymakers to ensure that school boards have appropriate checks on 
their power, such as the ability for charter schools to appeal to a county or state.  The 
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second chapter highlights the need for ad hoc assistance in policy evaluation.  California 
pioneered the use of suspension bans, but policymakers have not attempted to analyze 
their impact on academic growth – or even other outcome like dropout rates.  Academics 
can either push to build evaluations into policymaking, or we can evaluate policies 
ourselves.  The third chapter shows how researchers embedded within school districts are 
well positioned to engage in detailed policy analysis.2  The impact of ability grouping 
may hinge on curricular design, teacher training, or other nuanced factors.  If a researcher 
is working in a school district that is committed to making a policy work, they can 
engage in the meticulous work necessary to try and test many variations of 
implementation.  These are not roles that academics are taught to play in most graduate 
schools, but such work may be a promising way to improve academic growth for 
students. 
 
 
                                                        
2 Placing researchers in education agencies is an explicit goal of the Strategic Data Project fellowship 
(https://sdp.cepr.harvard.edu/), a program out of Harvard University’s Center for Education Policy 
Research. 
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CONTINGENT ON TYPE: HOW THE FIRST CHARTER SCHOOL IMPACTS 
DISTRICT ACADEMIC GROWTH 
Overview 
How do charter schools impact the academic growth of the school districts in 
which they operate?  We can estimate the causal effect of charter schools on their own 
students when they use a lottery to determine enrollment; we have no analogous way to 
evaluate the effect on nearby non-charter students.  This causes recent literature reviews 
to reach a vague conclusion: charter schools have either a neutral or positive impact on 
the academic performance of the districts in which they operate (Buddin et al. 2015, 
Booker and Gill 2016).  However, the most methodologically rigorous analysis in the 
literature – an instrumental variable analysis in a Southwestern school district – is also 
the one negative finding (Imberman 2011).   
The extant literature suffers from two important issues.  One is that its findings 
are driven by large school districts.  Many studies focus exclusively on large districts: 
Chicago and Denver (Zimmer et al. 2009), Milwaukee (Nisar 2012), Ney York City 
(Cordes 2016; Winters 2012), Philadelphia and San Diego (Zimmer et al. 2009), and an 
anonymous Southwestern district (Imberman 2011).  The problem is that most school 
districts are small; 93% of public school districts serve fewer than 10,000 students.  
Combined, these relatively small districts serve approximately half of the 50 million 
public school students in the United States.  Even studies that cover entire states – or in 
the case of Davis (2013), the entire country – obtain most variation in charter competition 
from a small number of large urban districts.  To take California as an example, in 2015 
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less than a third of all districts – 217 of 939 – contained any charter schools, and 
approximately half of those – 135 of 217 – only had one!  Large districts with a growing 
number of charter schools are the exception, not the norm. 
The second main issue for the extant literature is the reliance on relatively narrow 
observational data.  This leaves findings vulnerable to issues such as omitted variable 
bias, selection bias, and sampling bias.  Factors that encourage the opening of charter 
schools – such as parent engagement or community activism – may also impact the 
academic performance of nearby district schools.  Such factors could bias an observed 
relationship between charter competition and district performance.  This casts doubt on 
the internal validity of much of the literature.  Imberman (2011) stands out by using the 
availability of facilities for charter schools as an instrument for charter competition.  His 
finding of a negative relationship with district academic growth is at odds with the rest of 
the literature.  However, his work also highlights sampling bias: it is unclear whether 
Imberman’s finding is unique because of the particular district he studies or because the 
rest of the literature suffers from omitted variable bias.   
This paper advances the literature in three ways.  First, it shifts the focus away 
from large districts by analyzing the most common change in charter competition: a 
district-gradespan shifting from no charter schools to one.  This occurs in a much more 
representative set of districts than other changes in charter competition, alleviating 
concerns of sampling bias.  Second, this paper brings some certainty to the literature by 
dealing with omitted variable bias and selection bias with two innovative analyses 
detailed below.  Finally, this paper highlights the important theoretical and practical 
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difference between two types of charter schools, referred to in California as locally 
funded and directly funded.  We find that only directly funded charter schools boost the 
academic performance of their districts.  While the boost is small, it undermines the 
common critique that charter schools harm the academic growth of other students by 
obtaining funding that used to go to their local district.   
This paper proceeds in five parts.  It begins by unpacking the literature on the 
impact of charter schools on their local school districts, leading to the hypotheses the 
literature would make concerning this paper’s research question: how does the opening of 
a district’s first charter school impact district academic growth?  The second part explains 
why the charter sector in California is an ideal context for this study and describes two 
types of charter schools: locally funded and directly funded.  The third part details the 
data and main analyses we use to answer that question.  The fourth part explains threats 
to inference and efforts to overcome them.  The final part reviews the findings and 
examines their implications. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
The literature views the impact of charter schools on their districts through the 
lens of economic competition (Clark 1961; Hirschman 1970).  Charters are tuition-free 
and must accept all students; therefore, charter schools and their local districts typically 
are capable of serving overlapping sets of students.  Theory hypothesizes that this 
competition for students compels school districts to change their behavior and provide 
better outcomes for students (Friedman, 1962; Hoxby, 2003; Hess, 2004).   
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While theory does not specify how districts would respond – e.g. increased 
learning time, teacher quality, or innovative practices – it does imply that the magnitude 
of change should be related to the degree of competition.  This testable implication of 
theory dominates the literature.  From this context, it makes sense that researchers have 
developed various ways to measure charter competition.  One method is to focus on 
absolute presence: the distance to the closest charter school (e.g. Davis 2013) or the 
number of charter schools within a certain radius of a district school (e.g. Zimmer et al. 
2009).  A second approach focuses on relative presence: usually measured as the percent 
of students in a district who attend charter schools (e.g. Booker et al. 2008).  The third 
approach can be called qualified presence because it combines one of the above 
approaches with some other factor seen as crucial to determining degree of competition.  
Cremata and Raymond (2014) argue that charter schools need to be relatively high 
performing in order to make districts feel competitive pressure.  In their reviews of the 
literature, Booker and Gill (2015) and Epple et al. (2015) argue that charter sectors must 
be growing, not just large, in order to have positive impacts on districts.  Researchers 
often conduct their analyses with more than one measure of charter competition (e.g. 
Booker et al. 2008). 
One disagreement in the literature concerns where exactly to look for a reaction to 
competition from charter schools.  At the most micro-level, it could be at the grade level.  
Jinnai (2013) finds evidence for this in North Carolina, with charters having a significant 
positive impact only on students in traditional schools’ overlapping grades, not non-
overlapping grades.  Most of the literature assumes a school-wide impact, looking for an 
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impact at nearby schools serving the same general grade span (e.g. elementary, middle, or 
high schools).  A more macro-level approach would look for a district-wide impact, 
looking for an impact at all schools district-wide serving that grade span. 
Three reasons make it reasonable to suspect that charter competition has district-
wide effects.  One, district administrators play important roles that support academic 
growth, with staff often bearing responsibility for particular grade spans.  Second, charter 
schools typically are not allowed to use geography as a criteria for enrolling students, 
meaning that charters often serve students from all over a district instead of just one 
attendance zone.  Third, a potential mechanism of competitive pressure is that the 
opening of one charter school makes people across the district fear the opening of another 
charter.  Importantly, district-wide impact is the most stringent test of any charter 
competition hypothesis because such a finding could vastly underestimate a larger impact 
that occurs only within certain schools or grades.  For all these reasons, this paper uses 
this most stringent test: the impact on district-gradespans, i.e. all schools in a particular 
gradespan (elementary, middle or high) in the school district. 
The literature has spent less time exploring differences between various charter 
school types.3  Most analyses lump all charters into one category and assume they will 
have the same effect.  While researchers always need to assume that some differences are 
not theoretically relevant, it is crucial to consider whether specific distinctions might be. 
                                                        
3 Charters are extremely diverse: from fully online organizations to schools that operate in closed down 
traditional school buildings, from no-excuses programs that require uniforms to Montessori campuses that 
emphasize student-led learning, and from stand-alone schools that focus on dropout recovery to large 
networks of schools that focus on college going and completion. 
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The main exception is Buddin and Zimmer (2005), who explore the difference 
between startups – charters that are brand new organizations – and conversions – charters 
that used to be traditional district schools.  The authors argued that conversions should 
exert less competitive pressure because they do not need to attract as many students from 
other district schools as startups do.  Despite this theoretical expectation, they find no 
significant difference between startups and conversions. 
This paper highlights a different charter type: locally funded and directly funded 
charter schools.4  As explained in more detail in later sections, locally funded charters 
have budgetary and operational constraints imposed by their districts.  At the extreme, 
districts even can revert locally funded charters back to traditional public schools; indeed, 
this occurred eight times between 2007 and 2013.  If a district feels competitive pressure 
from a locally funded charter, then the district could respond by changing the charter 
instead of changing its own behavior.  Since locally funded charters cannot maintain 
competitive pressure on districts, we hypothesize that this charter type does not cause 
districts to improve student outcomes: 
- Novel Hypothesis 1: Locally funded charters do not cause districts to increase 
academic growth 
                                                        
4 It is possible that some districts may strategically support the opening of locally funded charters in an 
effort to prevent the opening of a directly funded charter.  To the extent that this occurs, districts with 
locally funded charters will be different from other districts in unobservable ways.  However, California 
law states that districts are supposed to approve the opening of any charter school petition that meets 
particular conditions.  As long as there is still community interest in a directly funded charter school, the 
existence of a locally funded charter does not prevent the approval of the directly funded one.  Later 
sections will deal with the case where a district denial of a directly funded charter is overturned by the 
county or state board of education. 
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In contrast, directly funded charters operate independently from their districts.  
These charters have the authority to operate differently than the district in an effort to 
best serve students and families.  The need to maintain enrollment gives directly funded 
charters an incentive to serve students and families well.  While academic growth is not 
the only important outcome, it is certainly one important outcome.  Districts feeling 
competitive pressure from a directly funded charter cannot simply make the charter 
change.  Districts will have to change their own behavior to maintain their students.  In 
some cases, charter schools may be able to offer services – such as longer school days or 
innovative curricula – that districts are unable to provide.  However, all districts and 
charter schools can compete directly in terms of scores on statewide assessments.  
Therefore, we hypothesize that directly funded charters will tend to cause districts to 
improve student academic growth:   
- Novel Hypothesis 2: Directly funded charters do cause districts to increase 
academic growth 
These hypotheses are a novel contribution to the literature based on a previously 
overlooked difference in the extent to which charter schools are independent of their 
district. 
In addition, the literature generates a set of competing hypothesis about what to 
expect about the impact of the first charter school on its district.   In this study the 
absolute presence of charter schools is always small because there is only one charter 
within the district. 
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- Absolute Hypothesis: The first charter will have no impact on district academic 
growth 
The relative presence of charter schools varies depending on the size of the district: a 
very small district may see a large percentage of its students enroll in the first charter 
school, while a large district may lose less than 1% of its students. 
- Relative Hypothesis: The first charter will impact district academic growth 
proportional to the percent of schools that are charters 
There are two distinct theories that fall in the category of qualified presence.  In order to 
generate competitive pressure, either charter schools need to be relatively high 
performing (Cremata and Raymond 2014), or the charter sector must be large and 
growing (Booker and Gill 2015, Epple et al. 2015). 
- Qualified Hypothesis A: The first charter will impact district academic growth 
proportional to the relative academic performance of the charter school 
- Qualified Hypothesis B: The first charter – followed by no others for several 
years – will have no impact on district academic growth 
The next section explains why California, the U.S. state with the largest charter 
sector in the country, is a good setting to test these hypotheses. 
Background 
The charter sector in California has three features that make it ideal for this 
analysis.  First, the size and nature of charter sector growth provide a large enough 
number of observations to address our research question: how does the first charter 
impact its district?  The number of California charter schools increased rapidly in a short 
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timeframe over a geographically dispersed area.  The number of charter schools increased 
from 181 in the 1999-2000 school year to 1,059 in the 2012-13 school year.5  Those years 
bookmark the previous assessment era, allowing us to calculate consistent measures of 
academic growth.  Additionally, charters opened all over the state in a wide array of 
districts; over 100 districts experienced the opening of their first and only charter school 
between 2003 and 2013. 
The second feature about California is that charter schools can be one of two 
types: locally funded or directly funded.  While other states have only one of these 
charter types, both are significant in California; locally funded charter schools have 
consistently been approximately a third of the charter sector.  This paper advances the 
literature by formulating and testing the hypothesis that the impact of a charter school 
depends on its funding type.  Locally funded charters are informally referred to as 
“affiliated charters” by district staff and as “dependent charters” by charter advocates.  
Districts possess significant levers of control over these charter schools.  Districts 
typically control their budgets, appoint a majority of their boards, and require staff to 
abide by the districts’ collective bargaining agreements.  In contrast, directly funded 
charters are informally referred to as “independent charters” because of their autonomy 
                                                        
5 In fact, 181 charters in 1999-2000 is a high estimate.  The state only began including which schools were 
charters in 2006-07 data files, so we obtain estimates for previous years using the open date for those 2006-
07 charters.  However, 74 of those charters have open dates before 1993, the year that California first 
issued charters.  That means that these 74 must have opened as traditional public schools on their open date 
and converted to charter schools by 2006-07.  We know 29 charters began in 1993, and since only 11 
schools have open dates of 1993 we can assume that 18 of the 74 schools with early open dates became 
charters in 1993.  That means the remaining 56 schools with early open dates converted to charters at some 
point between 1994 and 2006.  Some of those 56 charters probably opened after 1999-2000, but we assume 
they all opened before then. 
On the other hand, it is possible that a few charters that were open in 1999-2000 closed before 2006-07, 
preventing us from including them in our estimate. 
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from their districts.  These charters control their own budget, structure their own board, 
and are not bound by the collective bargaining agreement of their district. 
These two types of charter schools represent competing visions of the role of 
charter schools.  Since the first California charter schools opened in 1993, people have 
debated whether charters should be internal or external forces of change.  Those who 
prefer internal innovation see locally funded charters as a valuable tool of district-
directed flexibility and innovation.  Those who prefer external innovation see directly 
funded charters as helpful disruptors and incubators of experimentation.   
Lastly, California has a relatively flexible legal environment concerning the 
authorization and oversight of charter schools.  Since we are analyzing new charter 
schools, it would be important to note if the law caused our sample to be biased in terms 
of charter mission, composition, or quality.  California charter law states that all school 
districts must allow charter schools to open as long as the charter petition fulfills generic 
legal requirements.  While districts can interpret the law differently, any charter school 
that feels unfairly denied can appeal to the county and, if that also fails, even to the state.  
There is a cap on the number of charter schools that can exist statewide, but it is much 
higher than the current number of charters and increases by 100 each year – faster than 
the current growth rate.  The National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, an advocacy 
organization, has one main critique of California’s law: insufficient accountability 
provisions for charter schools.  Therefore, California charter schools can remain open 
even if they provide very low quality educational outcomes for their students.  By making 
it relatively easy to open charter schools and relatively hard to enforce a level of quality, 
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the law allows for a wide range of charters to open in California.  This means that the 
charters in California do not face significant pressure to follow a particular model, serve 
particular types of students, or maintain a particular level of quality.  If such filtering 
mechanisms existed, they would be important to consider because they would probably 
influence where charters tend to open. 
Data and Main Analyses 
We look at 1,404 district-gradespans in California, 72 of which had their first and 
only charter school open between 2003 and 2010.6  These dates allow us to measure three 
years of growth data before and after the charter school opened.  The independent 
variable is the opening of that first and only charter.  The dependent variable is change in 
academic growth, reported by California’s Department of Education as change in the 
state’s Academic Performance Index.7  We average growth across schools in a district-
gradespan, excluding the one charter and any alternative schools.8  Growth over three 
years provides a better estimation of the trend than relatively volatile single-year growth 
measures.  We therefore calculate growth based on the three years before the charter 
                                                        
6 This analysis excludes 1 case where there was no district school in the gradespan in which the charter 
opened (because there is no change in academic growth to analyze), 4 cases where the charter was a virtual 
school (because these charters attract only very particularly types of students), 11 cases where a locally 
funded charter opened in a district-gradespan with only one public school (because these are outlier cases), 
and 30 cases where that one charter school was an alternative school (because these charters serve special 
student populations). 
7 The Academic Performance Index (API) is based on standardized test scores, which themselves are 
limited measures of academic learning.  Each year the state changed the exact calculation used to determine 
schools’ scores: the list of included assessments could change, assessments could be given different 
weights, etc.  However, the state produced growth scores each year that used the same API calculation in 
two consecutive school years.  In order to determine three years of growth, we add up the growth scores 
from three years.  The API (i.e. achievement) scores are not comparable across that many years. 
8 The state designates schools that serve a special population as “Alternative” and/or “ASAM” (Alternative 
School Accountability Model).  For simplicity, this paper refers to schools with either of those designations 
as “alternative” and excludes them from analysis. 
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school opened and compare that to the three years after it opened.  If anything, this may 
underestimate the impact of a charter school opening; charters may generate a one-year 
increase in growth that then disappears by the second year.  To ensure that statewide 
growth trends do not bias the results, growth in each year is normalized to the state 
average for all students attending non-alternative schools.  We then convert that growth 
to standard deviation units using the mean and standard error for the entire sample of 
non-alternative schools in the state.9 
The main analysis utilizes a difference-in-differences design.  (The following 
section details analyses that overcome omitted variable bias.)  The first difference is the 
average change in academic growth for non-alternative district schools during the three 
years before and three years after their one charter school opened.10  The second 
difference is between different types of district-gradespans.  District-gradespans that have 
no charter open during this period experienced virtually no change in growth (1%).11  
District-gradespans where one charter opened experienced approximately the same 
change (3%).  However, our two novel hypotheses would expect the change in academic 
growth to depend on charter type.  This is exactly what we see in the last two columns of 
Figure 1.  Locally funded charters do not lead to increase in academic growth; if 
                                                        
9 This measure has an uncertain relationship with value added measures of academic growth, the gold 
standard in academic research.  However, this measure has the benefit of being widely reported and 
understood among the public at the time.  Therefore, this measure is an excellent measure of perceived 
improvement in academic quality.  Given that the state did not report another type of academic growth 
during this period, this change in API measures only way in which all parents, school leaders, and district 
staff would estimate changes in school quality. 
10 It is worth noting that to the extent these charter schools are guilty of skimming high-performing students 
from their districts, this will depress the growth we measure in district schools. 
11 When districts have no charter school open, it is unclear what year we should use to calculate change in 
growth.  We average the results from all eight possible calculations, with the “year” of a charter not 
opening ranging from 2003 to 2010. 
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anything, they may lead to a decrease (-7%).  In contrast, directly funded charters lead to 
an increase in growth (6%). 
Figure 1: Change in Growth for District-Gradespans  
  
Note: Outcome is the three years of growth after a charter opened minus the three years of growth before a 
charter opened, averaged for all schools that are not alternative or charter.  Excludes 1 case where there 
was no district school in that gradespan, 4 cases where the one charter that opened was a fully virtual 
charter school, 30 cases where that charter was an alternative school, and 11 cases where a locally funded 
charter opened in a district-gradespan with only one traditional public school.  When the last 11 cases are 
included, the change in growth for locally funded charters drops to -29% of a standard deviation. 
The small number of observations create a large amount of uncertainty around 
these estimates.  A t-test comparing district-gradespans with directly funded charters to 
those with no charter produce a p-value of 0.47.  T-tests comparing locally and directly 
funded charters have a p-value of 0.50 when we exclude the 11 district-gradespans with 
only one traditional school; however, the p-value drops to 0.05 when we include those 11 
observations.   
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We then analyze the data in a second way.  Ignoring locally funded charters, we 
find that 96 district-gradespans had the first directly funded charter open between 2003 
and 2010.  This larger group experienced a 4% increase in academic growth after the 
charter opened – almost exactly the same (6%) as the analysis above.  We then find 33 
district-gradespans that had their second directly funded charter school open between 
2003 and 2010.12  On average, we see an 11% standard deviation increase in growth after 
the second charter opens.  There are only 8 district-gradespans where a third charter 
opened in that timeframe; this leads to an average growth of 14%.13  Finally, there were 
12 district-gradespans that experienced a period of charter expansion between 2003 and 
2010, with their fourth or higher charter opening in that period.14  These district-
gradespans saw an average increase of 16%.  The consistently positive results are 
suggestive of a general trend; that independent charters increase district academic growth.  
Since the number of observations for individual columns is very low, we hesitate to make 
claims about the differences between them.  However, the evidence does not support the 
idea of a decreasing marginal return to each additional charter school; if anything, the 
evidence suggests the opposite. 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 Since we measure growth using three years of data before and after a charter school opens, we exclude: 
- 8 observations with were fewer than two years between the opening of the first and second charter 
- 1 observation where the third charter opened in 2011, just one year after the second charter 
13 We exclude 3 observations with fewer than two years between the opening of the second and third 
charter. 
14 We exclude 5 observations where the number of charters opening during 2000-2003 prevent us from 
measuring academic growth before charter expansion. 
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Figure 2: Change in Growth for District-Gradespans with Directly Funded Charters 
 
Note: Columns are determined based only on directly funded charters; we ignore the presence (or not) of 
locally funded charters.  The outcome is the three years of growth after a charter opened minus the three 
years of growth before a charter opened, averaged for all schools that are not alternative or charter.  We 
exclude observations with fewer than two years between charter openings. 
The larger number of observations provides greater certainty about some 
estimates.  The small numbers of observations in individual columns of Figure 2 means 
that the differences between them are not statistically significant.  A t-test comparing 
district-gradespans with one directly funded charter to none finds a p-value of 0.26.  
Pooling all the district-gradespans in Figure 2 and comparing them to those with no 
directly funded charters produces a p-value of 0.15.  While not at the standard level of 
statistical significance (usually p<0.10 or 0.05), the consistency of our findings coupled 
with the stringency of our tests suggest a non-random relationship. 
Before moving to threats to inference, we use the sample of district gradespans 
with one directly funded charters school to test four hypotheses from the literature.  We 
only find modest support for the Relative Hypothesis: the first charter will impact district 
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academic growth proportional to the percent of schools that are charters.  To test this, 
we measure the correlation between change in district academic growth and charter 
market share – the share of non-alternative schools in a district that are charter.  This 
correlation is 0.16 for the whole sample and 0.19 for directly funded charters.  While this 
correlation is very low, its direction is consistent with the Relative Hypothesis.  We find 
even weaker support for Qualified Hypothesis A: charter impact is proportional to their 
relatively high academic performance.  We test this by measuring the correlation 
between change in district academic growth and the charter school’s relative academic 
achievement.  We measure relative achievement as the difference between the score of 
the charter school and the average achievement score of all other non-alternative schools 
in the district-gradespan during the two years after the charter school opened.15  This 
correlation is 0.03 for the whole sample and 0.12 for directly funded charters.  Again, the 
direction is consistent with the hypothesis. 
As for the other hypotheses, evidence from directly funded charters directly 
counters the predictions that there would be no effect on district academic growth.  This 
does not support the Absolute Hypothesis (i.e. that the absolute number of nearby 
charters drives competition) or Qualified Hypothesis B (i.e. that the charter sector needs 
to be large and growing to have a significant impact).  While not statistically significant, 
Figure 2 shows that there might be larger increases in academic growth in the dozen 
                                                        
15 Theory requires that when measuring relative academic achievement we look at two instead of three 
years after the charter school opens.  The hypothesized mechanism is that people in the district see the 
relatively high performance of the charter school, which in turn motivates changes that lead to more growth 
in the district.  School scores are not reported until the fall of the next school year, so there would be a one-
year lag between observing relatively high performance and the impact of any subsequent reaction.  In 
contrast, all other factors – enrollment, size, and charter market share – are observed at the beginning of 
each school year. 
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district-gradespans whose charter sectors experience large expansions.  However, the 
very small number of observations prevents us from reaching strong conclusions for or 
against Qualified Hypothesis B. 
Threats to Inference 
The main finding above – that the opening of directly funded charter schools 
increases district academic growth – faces several threats to inference.  Our data was not 
produced in an experimental fashion.  There is omitted variable bias: charter openings 
were not random, which means that other factors besides the opening of a directly funded 
charter school may explain the subsequent increase in academic growth.  Additionally, 
there is selection bias: charters were not randomly assigned to districts, which means that 
the districts where charters opened may be categorically different than other districts.  
Even if charters did increase academic growth in the districts in our sample, charters may 
not have a similar effect in other districts.   There also is the possibility that some districts 
strategically open locally funded charter schools in an effort to prevent the opening of a 
directly funded charter school.  This means that the funding type of a district’s first 
charter school is not randomly assigned.  Districts with a locally funded charter may be 
different from other districts in a variety of unobservable ways – more strategic, better 
able to understand and respond to community needs, etc.16  
We make a variety of efforts to alleviate those concerns.  The difference-in-
differences nature of the analysis means that we control for all factors that are constant 
                                                        
16 It is important to note that California law states that districts should approve the opening of any charter 
school petition that meets particular conditions.  As long as there is still community interest in a directly 
funded charter school, the existence of a locally funded charter does not prevent the approval of the directly 
funded one.  
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within district-gradespans.  This eliminates a wide swath of omitted variable concerns.  
As for selection bias, charter schools opened across a wide range of districts in 
California, a large and diverse state with quite permissible charter school laws.  One 
potential concern is district size.  The literature has tended to focus on the experience of 
large, urban school districts; to what extent does the present analysis overcome this bias?  
Figure 3 shows that the district-gradespans with at least one charter have a size 
distribution somewhat similar to other district-gradespans.  There are important 
differences at the extremes of the distributions; those without charter schools are much 
more likely to have only one school, while those with at least one charter are much more 
likely to have 10 or more schools.  However, over half of district-gradespans with at least 
one charter had between 2 and 10 schools, and this portion of the distribution looks very 
similar to other district-gradespans.  This suggests that at least in terms of size, the 
findings are likely to apply to all district-gradespans, with the possible exception of those 
containing just a single school. 
Figure 3: Distribution of District-Gradespans by Number of Schools 
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Omitted variable bias is likely to come from two sources, one being the district’s 
willingness to authorize (i.e. open) the charter.  For example, districts willing to authorize 
a charter school may also be increasingly open to innovation.  This increasing openness 
to innovation (or some other district factor) may both improve academic growth and 
cause these charters to open.  In order to prove that such an omitted variable is not 
driving our findings, we would need to untangle district willingness to authorize from the 
opening of a directly funded charter school. 
The three-step process that determines charter school authorization in California 
allows us to do just that.17  First, anyone seeking to open a charter school must submit a 
detailed petition to the local school board.  If the district denies the charter petition, the 
second step is to appeal to the county board of education.  If the county also denies the 
petition, then the third and final step is to appeal to the state board of education.  There 
are 15 cases in our sample where districts actually denied the opening of a directly 
funded charter school, but the schools won an appeal to the county or state.  If district 
willingness to authorize is related to the true cause of academic growth, then those 15 
cases should have growth similar to district-gradespans with no charter school.  Instead 
those 15 cases have growth comparable to directly funded charters approved by the 
district; in fact, Figure 4 shows that their growth is even higher.  While there are not 
enough observations for statistical significance, it alleviates the concern that the main 
finding is driven by a factor related to district willingness to open a charter. 
                                                        
17 For context, other U.S. states have very different authorization processes.  At one extreme, states such as 
Massachusetts mandate that all charter schools be approved by one central entity.  At the other extreme, 
states such as Ohio allow for a wide variety of actors – districts, universities, nonprofit organizations, etc. – 
to authorize charter schools anywhere in the state. 
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Figure 4: Change in Growth for District Gradespans, Testing District Willingness 
 
Note: Outcome is the three years of growth after a charter opened minus the three years of growth before a 
charter opened, averaged for all schools that are not alternative or charter.   
The second likely source of omitted variable bias is the community’s ability to 
generate a charter petition.  An example of the latter would be that communities able to 
create charter petitions may have a growing number of educationally engaged parents, 
while communities that don’t create such petitions do not.  This growing number of 
engaged parents (or some other community factor) may improve academic growth and 
cause these charters to open.  In order to prove that our main finding is not caused by 
such an omitted variable, we would need to untangle community ability to generate a 
charter petition from the opening of a directly funded charter school. 
The best way to do this is to compare the impact of locally and directly funded 
charter schools.  For both types of charters, communities had to create petitions and go 
through the same process to get a charter approved.  Community ability is held constant.  
Nevertheless, only districts that opened directly-funded charters experienced higher 
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charters is statically significant (p-value is 0.05) when we include all observations.  There 
are not many cases of locally funded charters opening during the 2003 to 2010 window.  
Nevertheless, the available evidence – displayed in Figure 5 – suggests that they had, at 
best, a neutral effect on district academic growth.  As long as locally funded charters did 
not have a positive impact, the implication is that factors associated with community 
ability to generate a charter petition cannot be the underlying cause of academic growth. 
Figure 5: Change in Growth for District-Gradespans, Testing Community Ability 
 
Note: Outcome is the three years of growth after a charter opened minus the three years of growth before a 
charter opened, averaged for all schools that are not alternative or charter.  “With exclusions” means we 
excluded 11 observations where the district-gradespan contained only one traditional public school. 
Taken together, these analyses suggest that the positive result for directly funded 
charters is not a result of bias.  California is a large state with relatively lenient charter 
laws, allowing charters of wide ranging quality to open in a variety of contexts.  The 
district-gradespans that experienced the opening of their first directly funded charter fall 
along the spectrum in terms of size.  This suggests that these findings apply regardless of 
district size – an important addition to the existing literature.  The impact of directly 
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funded charters occurs even when districts deny the charter’s petition, revealing that 
factors associated with district willingness do not explain the results.  Lastly, a similar 
impact does not appear to occur in locally funded charters, suggesting that factors 
associated with community ability to generate a charter petition do not explain the results.  
These additional analyses alleviate the primary threats to inference and bolster the case 
that these findings reflect a causal impact. 
Conclusions and Implications 
This paper finds that the opening of the first charter school in a district-gradespan 
causes an increase in academic growth – but only if the charter is directly funded (i.e. 
independent of district control).  In contrast, the impact is not positive when the charter 
that opens is locally funded (i.e. affiliated with the district).  The impact of directly 
funded charters is relatively small: approximately 5% of a standard deviation, or half of 
the difference between teachers in the top and bottom quartiles of performance.  
However, the impact is widespread: over three years and including all non-alternative 
schools in the district-gradespan where the charter opened.  Using such a broad measure 
of growth may underestimate a larger and narrower impact on growth, such as over a 
single year in a smaller number of schools.  However, it is possible to imagine 
mechanisms involving district staff that would cause such a widespread impact.  Future 
research could provide insight into the exact mechanisms that lead from the opening of 
the first charter school to increased district academic growth. 
This paper adds to the literature about the impact charter schools have on district 
schools in four ways.  First, it highlights the distinction between locally and directly 
  
31 
funded charter schools.  Charter schools only impact district academic growth when they 
are directly funded, which means they are independent in terms of collective bargaining, 
board governance, and budgetary decisions.  To the extent that other states provide 
charter schools with varying degrees of independence, we are likely to see varying 
degrees of impact on district schools.  Second, this paper shifts the focus towards smaller 
school districts.  The extant literature is dominated by analyses of large urban districts, 
but approximately half of all students are in the 93% of districts serving fewer than 
10,000 students.  The districts in this analysis are a much more representative sample of 
all districts, which helps to alleviate concerns of selection bias. 
Third, this paper advances the literature by alleviating some of the primary 
concerns about omitted variable bias.  We see the same impact even when districts deny 
the charter school, implying that factors related to district willingness to open a charter 
school cannot explain the results.  On the other hand, we do not see the impact when the 
charter school that opens is locally funded, implying that factors related to community 
willingness to open a charter school cannot explain the results.  The extant literature only 
has one analysis with more internal validity: an instrumental variable analysis of one 
southwestern school district (Imberman 2011).  However, the finding in this paper has 
greater external validity because it is based upon a much larger and more representative 
set of districts. 
Fourth and lastly, this finding suggests that the literature should shift beyond an 
economic theory based on competition for students.  Such a theory can only partly 
explain the patterns in the data.  There is modest support for the hypotheses that charter 
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impact on their districts is proportional to their relative market share and to their relative 
academic performance.  Additionally, the differential impact of locally and directly 
funded charters – this paper’s novel theoretical contribution – supports the economic 
theory of competition.  However, the correlations in the data are low enough to suggest 
that the economic theory is not the entire explanation.  While beyond the scope of this 
paper, it could be that the mechanisms at play are more psychological than economic.  It 
is not difficult to imagine that the opening of the first directly funded charter school is a 
watershed moment for most small- to medium-sized districts.  This may prompt local 
leaders to acknowledge issues that were previously ignored and feel an urgency to take 
action.  No such psychological effect occurs with locally funded charters because these 
schools do not really pose a threat to districts.  Future researchers could explore this 
theory further. 
The findings have interesting practical implications, as well.  A powerful 
argument against charter schools has been that since they drain financial resources from 
districts, they harm district students academically.  Charters typically do reduce district 
budgets, and research indeed links financial resources to academic growth (e.g. Jackson 
et al. 2014).  The finding in this paper implies that the academic benefits from 
competition outweigh the harm caused by financial reductions. 
Additionally, state leaders can encourage academic growth through charter school 
policy.  They should ensure that charter schools have the independence necessary to 
increase district academic growth.  They could make it easier for charters to open in 
districts that currently have none.  While even the second or third charters may have 
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similar impact, the limited number of observations makes the evidence base strongest for 
the first charter.  At the same time, state policymakers could prohibit or limit locally 
funded charters on the ground that they provide no external growth benefit and may even 
harm district growth. 
The two charter types in California – directly funded and locally funded – reflect 
two distinct visions for the way charter schools were supposed to improve public 
education.  Directly funded charters would innovate from the outside, while locally 
funded charters would innovate from the inside.  Unfortunately, the evidence suggests 
that districts experience either static or declining growth when they open a locally funded 
charter.  This may have the effect – intended or not – of moving the forces of innovation 
into a silo at one school.  Future case studies of some of these districts could illuminate 
the exact reasons locally funded charters fail to generate academic gains in their districts. 
The evidence presented here suggests that the opening of more directly funded 
charters would slightly improve academic growth in the thousands of school districts with 
no charters at all.  Making this a reality, however, will require looking beyond the large 
urban districts that so frequently obtain our attention.  Time will tell if charter schools 
shift from being primarily a solution to the problems of large urban districts to being a 
much broader source of innovation and improvement within our system of public 
education. 
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BANNING PROGRESS: SUSPENSION BANS AND SCHOOLWIDE ACADEMIC 
GROWTH 
Overview 
Of the approximately 50 million students in U.S. public elementary and secondary 
schools, close to seven percent – 3.5 million – are suspended each year.  Descriptive 
statistics suggest that at least some suspensions are racially biased and unnecessary: 
African-American, Latino, and American Indian students are at least twice as likely as 
other students to be suspended (Wallace et al. 2008), and suspension rates have doubled 
over the past several decades (Losen 2011).18  Simultaneously, many schools and districts 
have successfully managed student behavior while issuing few to no out-of-school 
suspensions (e.g. Christle et al. 2005; Luiselli et al. 2005; Skiba & Sprague 2008).   
A variety of actors want to reduce suspensions.  Notably, the U.S. Department of 
Education promotes alternatives to suspension: the Behavior Education Program (Crone 
et al. 2010), function-based interventions (e.g. Liaupsin et al. 2006), and school-wide 
positive behavior support (Luiselli et al. 2005; Putnam et al. 2006; Skiba and Sprague 
2008).  The National Association of State Boards of Education recommends that states 
include suspension rates in their accountability systems (Charis and Losen 2017).  
                                                        
18 Factors beyond school discipline policy are likely to impact both of these trends: 
In 1975 Congress passed Public Law 94-142, which is now known as the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  This law has helped bring hundreds of thousands of students 
with disabilities from state institutions into public schools, as well as brought millions of students 
from segregated instructional environments into integrated classrooms.  In addition to its many 
benefits, Public Law 94-142 also could explain some of rise in suspension rates. 
(https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.html) 
- African-American, American Indian, and Latino students are more likely to be low-income, 
English Learners, and students with disabilities than students in other subgroups.  These students 
are also less likely to be taught by teachers who share their racial and cultural background.  This 
may explain some of the disproportionality in suspension rates.  
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Likewise, advocacy organizations emphasize the public costs of suspensions (e.g. 
Rumberger and Losen 2017) and highlight schools that report high overall or subgroup 
suspension rates (Losen et al. 2015).  Given this environment, it is unsurprising that many 
schools and districts are eager to reduce their suspension rates.  The fastest way to do that 
is to ban suspensions for all but the most serious offenses. 
Some suspension critics say that such suspension bans will produce schoolwide 
academic benefits.  They point to research that suspensions reduce academic performance 
for both suspended students and, in some cases, even their non-suspended classmates 
(Arcia 2006; Perry and Morris 2014).  However, the literature provides a second 
perspective: that suspensions can counter disruptive behavior that would otherwise 
reduce learning opportunities for all students (McFarland 2001).  Given the competing 
hypotheses, how do suspension bans impact schoolwide academic performance? 
The experience of Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), the second 
largest school district in the country, provides an opportunity to answer that question.  In 
May 2013, the LAUSD school board banned suspensions with the subjective rationale of 
“defiance,” forcing a sudden and precipitous drop in its use.  While not a true experiment, 
this policy shift can be called a natural experiment for determining the impact of a 
suspension ban.  A difference-in-differences research design allows us to estimate how 
this sudden imposed change in suspension rates impacted academics.  The first difference 
is temporal, comparing academic growth before and after the 2013 policy change.  The 
second difference is geographic, comparing schools within LAUSD to those in the rest of 
California – i.e. schools that did not receive the “treatment” of a suspension ban.  We test 
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three distinct hypotheses, and all of them support the conclusion that the LAUSD 
suspension ban harmed academic growth. 
This paper proceeds in six sections.  The first recounts the history of suspension 
bans.  Next is an overview of the competing theories and hypotheses the behavior 
management literature provides concerning suspension bans.  The third section details the 
data and measures used to measure suspensions and academic growth.  The fourth 
sections walks through the analyses and results.  The fifth section describes the remaining 
threats to inference and how additional analyses alleviate many of those concerns.  The 
paper concludes with implications of the findings and next steps for practitioners and 
researchers. 
Background 
Suspension bans emerged as a reaction to the zero tolerance approach to school 
discipline.  Zero tolerance policies administer strict punishment for relatively minor rule 
violations, often regardless of the circumstances and without formal due process (Cerrone 
1999).  The logic of this approach borrows from the broken window theory in the 
criminology literature (Wilson and Kelling 1982).  Like broken window theory, zero 
tolerance makes two primary assumptions.  One concerns the relationship between minor 
incidents (e.g. talking rudely to a teacher) and major incidents (e.g. fighting someone).  
Zero tolerance approaches assume that the presence of minor incidents makes major 
incidents more likely.  The second assumption is that instituting policies of strict 
punishment for minor violations will make these incidents less frequent.  This will occur 
through some combination of convincing students who get punished to not violate the 
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rule again and convincing other students to never violate the rule at all.  If valid, then the 
zero tolerance approach should lead to fewer minor and major incidents. 
  Interestingly, zero tolerance policies became widespread in schools partly 
because of the passage of a federal gun law: the Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994.  This law 
made federal education funding conditional on districts expelling students for a full 
calendar year if they brought a gun to school.  This can be construed as a zero tolerance 
policy.  Having a gun at school is relatively minor compared to brandishing or using a 
gun at school.  This new law strictly punished the presence of guns as an effort to reduce 
the number of times any guns were brought onto or used on school campuses.  Many 
states and districts used this law as a model to update their systems of discipline, adopting 
policies of automatic suspensions for a wide variety of relatively minor infractions (Skiba 
and Knesting 2001).  By the early 2000s schools were suspending nearly twice as many 
students as in the 1970s (Wald and Losen 2003). 
Suspension bans are an attempt to counter zero tolerance policies.  Instead of 
automatic suspensions for minor infractions, suspension bans typically forbid schools 
from suspending students for all but the most serious infractions, such as those involving 
violence and drugs.  LAUSD was the first large district to adopt such a ban for all grades.  
Surprisingly, the story of that first suspension ban starts with the federal tax reform law 
of 1986. 
The 1986 tax law required nonprofit health organizations to start paying taxes.  
Blue Cross of California subsequently struggled to compete with for-profit competitors, 
so in 1996 it converted into an investor-owned for-profit called WellPoint Health 
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Networks, Inc. (Kane 1997).  This required the creation of The California Endowment 
(TCE), a nonprofit charitable organization with an endowment of $2.3 billion.  
Newspapers across the state expressed concern that TCE’s enormous endowment would 
allow it to dominate policy debates, and that the public would be unable to ensure that 
TCE acted in its interest.19  Perhaps to allay these concerns, the website for TCE 
emphasizes that its 17-member board is extremely diverse and “is designed to reflect a 
cross-section of California’s people and places.”20 
TCE produced a case study detailing its school discipline efforts in California 
(Martinez et al. 2013).  While self-commissioned histories should always be read with 
caution, the events described suggest that TCE indeed played an unexpected and 
indispensable role in building the anti-suspension movement in California.  In 2010, TCE 
launched a multi-million dollar effort called Building Healthy Communities to improve 
the health of 14 areas in California.  While collecting input from stakeholders, TCE staff 
were surprised to hear that the abundant use of school suspensions was harming students’ 
social and emotional health.  TCE’s statewide policy team looked into school suspensions 
and found that it was “an issue that framed correctly could have legs in Sacramento” 
because it was a widespread problem that could be remedied through relatively small 
changes to state education law (Martinez et al. 2013, p. 7).  California Education 
Code Section 48900(k) allows schools to suspend students if they have “[d]isrupted 
school activities or otherwise willfully defied the valid authority of supervisors, teachers, 
                                                        
19 For example, see Thelen J., “Charity or Advocacy for HMOs?” The 
Recorder, 30 September 1994; Editorial, “Blue Doublecross?” San Jose Mercury 
News, 11 November 1994; Editorial, “The Blue Cross Octopus,” Sacramento Bee, 6 December1994. 
20 http://www.calendow.org/our-story/#leadership  
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administrators, school officials, or other school personnel engaged in the performance of 
their duties.”  Defiance is the most subjective basis on which schools can issue 
suspensions; other rationales concern various forms of theft, violence, and possession of 
illegal substances.  Many schools have made frequent use of this flexibility to remove 
defiant students from school.  When the state began collecting suspension data with these 
categories in 2011-12, it reported over 200,000 based on defiance, constituting 39% of all 
suspensions.21  
Having decided to focus on school discipline, TCE used its resources to connect 
interest groups to one another.  In May 2011, TCE convened a discussion of school 
discipline with community organizers from 8 of the 14 communities along with a 
statewide advocacy organization called Fight Crime: Invest in Kids.  TCE then created 
the School Discipline Action Team, a coalition of three distinct groups: 
1. Community organizers, such as Community Asset Development Re-defining 
Education (CADRE) and Labor Community Strategy Center (LCSC), who 
had worked for over a decade with families suffering from zero tolerance 
policies. 
2. Legal advocates, such as Public Counsel and the American Civil Liberties 
Union, who knew the technical details necessary to know how to change 
school discipline law. 
                                                        
21 For simplicity, “suspensions” without any qualifier refers to out-of-school suspensions. 
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3. State advocates, Children Now and Fight Crime: Invest in Kids, who were 
“new to the discipline issue” but also “were sophisticated, repeat players on 
the statewide scene” (Martinez et al. 2013, p. 8). 
The School Discipline Action Team soon drafted 10 bills, but the community organizers 
lacked the expertise to keep up with the legal and state advocates; “even though CADRE 
and LCSC were formally involved when the legislative priorities were being hashed out 
in December 2011 and January 2012, they had limited ability to make substantive 
contributions” (Martinez et al. 2013, p. 11). 
In the final phase, TCE executed a strategic communications plan designed to 
amplify and coordinate messages from a range of interest groups.  TCE created a 
television commercial that aired in Sacramento as legislators considered the 10 bills.  
Additionally, TCE paid for a statewide poll about school discipline and strategically 
released those poll results simultaneously with recent research on suspensions.  Seven of 
the ten bills passed both chambers, leaving it to Governor Jerry Brown to either sign or 
veto them.  Weeks before Governor Brown made his decisions, TCE paid for all the 
facilities, rental, and travel costs for speakers to attend an event in Los Angeles to 
highlight the issue of harsh school discipline.  Governor Brown ended up signing five of 
the seven bills into law.  One veto was a bill that would have imposed a statewide ban on 
suspensions based on defiance. 
That veto was only a temporary setback.  In 2013, some of the community 
organizing groups that TCE had supported pushed for LAUSD to ban all suspensions 
based on defiance.  The ban was backed by Superintendent John Deasy, an education 
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reformer, and approved by five out of seven members of the school board, which was 
frequently at odds with the superintendent.  This surprising unity reflects the success of 
TCE’s work at making the case for suspension bans in the court of California public 
opinion generally and among policymakers in particular. 
Other districts and states soon started to adopt suspension bans.  San Francisco 
Unified School District instituted its own ban in the summer of 2014, followed by 
Pasadena Unified School District in December 2014 and Oakland Unified School District 
in the summer of 2015 (Frey 2015).  California state officials then started the trend of 
banning defiance suspensions only in younger grades; they banned these suspensions for 
grades K-3 starting in the 2015-16 school year.  Since then the policy has spread across 
the country, with school boards issuing suspension bans for grades K-5 in Oregon22 and 
grades K-2 in Texas (Reid-Cleveland 2017) and New York City (Berwick 2017).  
Additional bans are under consideration in cities such as Pittsburgh (Lindstrom 2017) and 
Philadelphia (Cline-Thomas and Chang 2017).23 
Advocacy groups continue to pressure policymakers to reduce suspensions.  The 
Civil Rights Project out of the University of California, Los Angeles is a leader of these 
efforts, using a multi-pronged strategy that includes appeals to potential legal action, 
                                                        
22 For coverage in local news reports, see: http://gov.oregonlive.com/bill/2015/SB553/  
23 It is unclear whether policymakers are adopting suspension bans because they are facing similar 
incentives, or if policymakers are learning from each other through policy diffusion (Volden et al 2008).  If 
it is policy diffusion, it would most likely be the imitation mechanism, with leaders copying the policy 
without considering its wider effects (Shipan and Volden 2008).  The mechanisms of competition and 
coercion do not seem to apply, and the learning mechanism makes the assumption that subsequent adopters 
knew the impact of California’s early suspension bans.  The policy itself is very simple, which makes it 
easy to adopt (Makse and Volden 2011).  Given the decentralized control of education policy, it is 
especially easy for state or local school boards to experiment with school discipline policies (Shipan and 
Volden 2012). 
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monetary savings, and public exposure.  The organization’s report about the discipline 
gap described the huge disparities in out-of-school suspensions as a “potentially unlawful 
denial of educational opportunity” (Losen et al. 2015).  Another report estimated that the 
lifetime cost of suspensions for one cohort of California high school students was $2.7 
billion (Rumberger and Losen 2017).  The Civil Rights Project simultaneously published 
an online dataset of individual districts’ suspension rates, cost of suspensions, and 
potential benefit from discipline reform.24   
We conclude this section by noting that the federal government has contributed to 
school discipline reform.  Under the Obama administration, agencies pushed hard against 
racial disproportionality in suspension rates.  In 2014, the U.S. Department of Education 
and Department of Justice published a “Dear Colleague” letter containing a school 
discipline guidance package.25  The package emphasized that school discipline must be 
done without being discriminatory, and the inclusion of the Department of Justice 
signaled that the federal government would pursue legal action against districts who 
failed to comply.  Indeed, the Department of Education had previously reached voluntary 
legal settlements with a number of school districts with racially disproportionate 
suspensions, including LAUSD in 2011 and Oakland Unified in 2012.26  While the 
Education and Justice Departments are not prioritizing these efforts under the Trump 
administration, anti-suspension information and resources are still available.  The 
                                                        
24 Available here: http://www.fixschooldiscipline.org/costsofdiscipline/  
25 Available here: https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-departments-education-and-justice-release-
school-discipline-guidance-package-  
26 See https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/09105001-b2.pdf and 
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-announces-voluntary-resolution-oakland-
unified-school-di  
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Department of Education website still contains a section “Suspension 101” that includes 
the headlines “Suspensions don’t work,” “Suspensions have negative consequences,” and 
“There are effective alternatives to suspension.”27   
Theory and Hypotheses 
How does the literature expect a suspension ban to impact academic growth?  
Education researchers have not used the ideal research method of a randomized 
controlled trial to test behavior management policies.  This is partly for ethical reasons: 
schools and districts cannot randomly suspend only some students for rule violations.28  
This has forced the literature to rely on sub-optimal methods to estimate the impact of a 
suspension ban.  
One strand of the behavior management literature suggests suspension bans will 
increase academic growth through two mechanisms.  First, students who would have 
been suspended without the policy should now have higher academic growth.  Arcia 
(2006) makes this claim based on a matching analysis.  Students who received 
suspensions are matched with students with similar observed characteristics – such as 
academics, demographics, and prior behavior issues – who did not receive suspensions.  
Suspended students had much worse academic outcomes in subsequent years.  The 
problem is that this difference in outcomes may be caused at least partly by unobserved 
differences between matched students.  For example, students who did not receive 
suspensions may have had better home environments or peer relationships.  The second 
                                                        
27 https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/index.html 
28 However, it would be ethically sound for districts to randomly assign schools to one of two (or more) 
equally promising discipline reform programs. 
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mechanism argues that even students who would not have been suspended should 
experience higher growth because they suffer less from the distraction of a punitive 
environment created by issuing too many suspensions.  This mechanism finds support in 
Perry and Morris’s work in American Sociological Review (2014).  They use fixed-effect 
regression models to find that fluctuations in suspension rates cause subsequent 
fluctuations in academic performance.  This assumes that there are no omitted variables 
that might cause both changes.29  However, omitted variables almost certainly are a 
problem.  Factors such as sudden problems in students’ home lives or peer relationships 
are likely to cause both an increase in suspensions and a decrease in academic growth.   
A second strand of the literature proposes that a suspension ban will decrease 
academic growth.  This perspective argues that suspensions are a tool teachers can use to 
remove defiant students, thereby providing more opportunities for the vast majority of 
students to learn.  By observing classrooms repeatedly over an entire school year, 
McFarland (2001) sees that defiant behavior can harm both teachers and other students.  
Defiant behavior can derail teachers’ plans, increase their stress, and – in the most 
extreme cases – even cause them to leave their positions.  Teachers can take actions to 
prevent most defiant behavior from occurring, but this requires training and practice.  If 
teachers have no tool other than suspensions to deal with defiance, then suddenly 
removing that tool would lead to classroom management problems.  This would result in 
lost learning opportunities for all students.  The main issue with this strand of the 
                                                        
29 Prior research was cross-sectional, comparing suspension rates to academic achievement (Rausch & 
Skiba 2004).  Even some recent papers on the subject sometimes use correlational evidence to support the 
claim that suspensions harm overall academic growth (Losen et al. 2015). 
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literature is limited external validity.  The fact that one researcher observed negative 
outcomes caused by defiant students in a small set of schools does not mean that the same 
negative outcomes would occur everywhere. 
 In summary, theory provides opposing views about how a sudden decrease in 
suspensions would impact academic performance.  The first strand views suspensions as 
completely harmful, so the more we reduce suspensions the more we will improve 
academic growth.  The second strand views suspensions as a tool for teachers; the more 
we restrain their ability to use this tool (without providing a replacement), the more we 
will harm academic growth.  Both strands of the literature have limitations based on the 
observational (i.e. non-experimental) nature of their evidence.  Furthermore, the recent 
adoption of suspension bans means that no researchers to date have explicitly studied the 
academic impact of this school discipline policy.   
The LAUSD suspension ban provides an opportunity to test three distinct 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between suspension reduction and academic 
growth: 
H1: Change in academic growth should be higher (lower) in LAUSD than in the 
rest of California 
H2a: The gap found in H1 should be even larger for schools that gave the banned 
suspensions before the LAUSD policy shift 
H2b: There should be almost no gap for schools that did not give the banned 
suspensions before the LAUSD policy shift 
  
46 
H3: Among schools in LAUSD, change in academic growth should be highest 
(lowest) in schools that used to give the most of those suspensions before the 
LAUSD policy shift 
H1 is the simplest hypothesis, comparing all schools that experienced the intervention 
(i.e. the 2013 suspension ban) to all schools that did not.  H2a and H2b highlight the fact 
that we primarily expect the suspension ban to impact schools that gave defiance 
suspensions prior to the ban.30  Finally, H3 exploits the fact that the suspension ban 
impacted schools within LAUSD differently based on how many defiance suspensions 
they gave prior to the ban.  The next two sections describe the data and analyses we use 
to test these three hypotheses. 
Data and Measurement 
The data suggests that the LAUSD suspension ban had an enormous impact on 
suspensions.31  Figures 6 and 7A show the number of suspensions based on defiance has 
dropped steadily state-wide in absolute and relative terms, while the absolute number 
given for other reasons has decreased slightly.32  Graphs 6 and 7B show a different story 
for LAUSD: a precipitous drop in 2013-14 that leads to an extremely small number of 
                                                        
30 We expect the suspension ban to have some impact on some schools that gave no defiance suspensions in 
2013. New students, changes in current students’ lives, and changes among school staff could all result in 
schools feeling a sudden need to give defiance suspensions.  In our analysis there were 201 schools outside 
of LAUSD that gave no defiance suspensions in 2013; 81 of them (40%) gave at least one defiance 
suspension in 2015, and 11 (5%) gave at least a dozen.  Likewise, some schools that gave defiance 
suspensions in 2013 may not feel a need to give any such suspensions after 2013, even in the absence of a 
ban.  Of the 866 schools outside of LAUSD that gave defiance suspensions in 2013, 127 (15%) gave no 
such suspensions in 2015.  This is why we expect the impact of the suspension ban to be driven mostly – 
but not entirely – by schools that gave defiance suspensions in 2013. 
31 Suspension data is available here: https://www.cde.ca.gov/ds/sd/sd/filessd.asp.  One suspension “incident 
is defined as one or more students committing one or more offenses on the same date at the same time.” 
32 Annually, the state has reported suspension data with the defiance category beginning with the 2011-12 
school year. 
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suspensions based on defiance.  This demonstrates the district-wide response to an 
explicit school board policy.  In May 2013, the LAUSD school board voted to ban 
suspensions based on defiance during the upcoming school year (Watanabe 2013b).  The 
overall compliance rate was high; from 2,814 suspension based on defiance in 2012-13 to 
just 305 in 2014-15.  In general, schools did not compensate by suspending students for 
other reasons; the number of those suspensions decreased over the same period at a rate 
faster than the statewide average. 
Figure 6: % of Out-of-School Suspensions Based on Defiance 
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Figures 8A and 8B: # of In-School Suspensions 
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Those constraints lead us to use a measure of the intent to treat: a categorical variable 
reflecting the number of suspensions based on defiance a school gave in 2013.  
Table 1 shows basic information for the groups of schools used to test each 
hypothesis.  Hypothesis one is the broadest, comparing all schools in LAUSD to all 
California schools outside of LAUSD.  The only requirement for inclusion is that schools 
must have the relevant growth data: sixth grade data in 2011 and 2013, and eighth grade 
data in 2013 and 2015.  Hypothesis two separates these schools based on whether they 
gave any suspensions based on defiance in 2013, before the LAUSD suspension ban took 
effect.  Hypothesis three looks only at schools within LAUSD.  Here we add one 
exclusion rule; we remove 19 schools that served high school students.  We do this 
because we want our schoolwide suspension data to reflect middle school, the grades 
where we are measuring academic growth. 
Table 1: Information about Schools in Analyses 
 Schools # of 
Schools 
Avg. # 2013 
Suspensions 
Avg. # 2015 
Suspensions 
Low-
Income 
English 
Learner 
Students w/ 
Disabilities 
H1 
LAUSD 113 6 1 81% 20% 12% 
Non-LAUSD 1,068 19 9 56% 20% 9% 
H2a 
LAUSD 79 8 1 83% 21% 12% 
Non-LAUSD 867 23 11 58% 20% 10% 
H2b 
LAUSD 34 0 0 79% 18% 11% 
Non-LAUSD 201 0 2 47% 19% 8% 
H3 
LAUSD: 0 29 0 0 77% 18% 10% 
LAUSD: 1-10 49 2 1 80% 19% 12% 
LAUSD: 11+ 16 27 3 89% 20% 14% 
  Note: Demographic variables reflect all tested students in 2015 
 
Available school-level suspension data has several important limitations.33  While 
we would ideally like to have data by grade level to match academic growth, the state 
                                                        
33 For ease of reading, “suspensions” from this point on refer to out-of-school suspensions based on 
defiance, unless explicitly qualified otherwise. 
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only reports data at the school level.  Additionally, redaction prevents us from calculating 
exact suspension rates for a subset of schools.  The state provides suspension data files 
containing data for each subgroup in each school, but in order to protect student 
confidentiality it does not report numbers between one and ten.  Using the 2013 (i.e. pre-
treatment) number of suspensions based on defiance produces the following 
categorization: 
1. None (29 schools) 
2. Between 1 and 10 (49 schools) 
3. At least 11 (16 schools) 
This can be viewed as a measure of the intent to treat.  If schools in LAUSD had 
complied perfectly with the suspension ban, then this categorization would perfectly 
reflect the absolute change in suspensions.  Officially, compliance was high enough to 
make this almost true.  Of the 94 schools in our sample, 67 had zero suspensions based 
on defiance in 2015, another 20 had one redacted subgroup (i.e. on average 1.5 
suspensions each), six schools had between two and twelve suspensions, and one school 
had thirty-five.   
 However, there are reasons to believe that the data after 2013 is not accurate.  In 
the first year of implementation, parents claimed that their children were sent home 
without being officially suspended (Watanabe 2014).  School staff became much more 
likely to call the police in order to deal with defiant students, forcing officers to remind 
school staff that “willful defiance is not a crime” (Watanabe 2015).  There are also a 
variety of ways to remove students from class but keep them in school, and 
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administrators may not report all those instances as in-school suspensions.  The street-
level bureaucracy literature is founded upon the notion that the actual implementation of 
top-down policies is determined largely by the decisions of front line, or street-level, 
workers (Lipsky 1980).  In this case, the street-level workers are school administrators 
and even teachers who decide how to deal with defiant students.  School staff see 
themselves as accountable to their students, parents, and fellow staff as well as their 
school board (Hupe and Hill 2007).  Staff therefore might report perfect compliance 
while finding ways to remove defiant students from school. 
Importantly, reported compliance is a confounding factor because it impacts the 
change in suspension rate and could also be related to the change in academic growth.  
Twelve LAUSD schools reported giving more suspensions based on defiance after the 
suspension ban.  These schools had relatively low growth rates in 2013 and grew even 
less in 2015 (see Appendix A for more details).  Instead of the increase in suspensions 
causing the drop in academic growth, it seems more likely that these schools suffered 
from other issues that led to both the increase in suspensions and the drop in academic 
growth. 
Data limitations place a variety of constraints on our ability to measure change in 
academic growth, the dependent variable.  The main issue is that California switched to a 
new assessment regime immediately after LAUSD enacted its policy.  Fortunately, the 
residual gain model of academic growth does not require that pre- and post-tests be on 
the same scale.  The basic residual gain model is a bivariate regression where the post-
test score is the dependent variable and the pre-test score is the independent variable.  
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The regression residuals estimate the extent to which students performed lower or higher 
than expected given their starting score.  This is one form of value-added modeling, 
which is the best available metric of academic growth in the education literature (e.g. 
Kogan et al. 2016b).34 
A related challenge is that the assessment regime prior to 2015 gave end-of-
course assessments for some high school English classes as well as all Math classes 
starting with Algebra, which some students took in middle school.  We can only calculate 
the residual gain model of academic growth when all students took the same assessment 
in the same grade.  This prevents measuring growth for high schools at all, or for middle 
school Math.  Elementary would be possible as well, but suspensions occur rarely among 
students below sixth grade.  Therefore, all measures of academic growth are based on 
middle school English assessments. 
Two other issues concern state reporting of academic data.  First, California did 
not publish any statewide assessment results in English or Math for the 2013-14 school 
year.  This means that the pre-test is sixth graders in spring 2013 and the post-test is eight 
graders two years later in spring 2015. 35  In order to calculate analogous growth prior to 
the policy intervention, we similarly span two years: sixth graders in spring 2011 to 
eighth graders in spring 2013.  The second issue is that the state only makes data 
                                                        
34 The value-add literature has primarily focused on its controversial use in teacher evaluation.  Using 
value-add estimates for entire grades avoids some concerns, such as sorting difficult-to-teach students into 
particular teachers’ classes (Rothstein 2009).  However, even grade level value-add measures can 
experience significant variation across time (Goldhaber and Hansen 2008) and can be sensitive to the 
assessment used (Lockwood et al. 2007).  On the positive side, value-add measures are highly correlated 
with principal evaluations of teachers (Kimball et al. 2004; Jacob and Lefgren 2008).   
35 Test results for 2010-11 to 2012-13 school years are here: https://star.cde.ca.gov/starresearchfiles.asp.  
Test results for the 2014-15 school year are here: https://caaspp.cde.ca.gov/sb2017/ResearchFileList. 
  
53 
available for entire grades at each school, not individual students.  Ideally, pre-test sixth 
grade scores and eighth grade post-test scores would include the exact same sets of 
students.  Reality is more complicated; some students leave and enter the sixth grade 
cohort because they change schools or are held back a grade.  If the weighted average 
score of the students who leave the cohort matches the weighted average of the students 
who enter, then there is no bias.  Bias occurs when students who enter and students who 
leave have different weighted average scores.  For example, imagine a school where 
equal numbers of students leave and enter the sixth grade cohort.  Students who leave are 
relatively high-achieving while students who enter are relatively low-achieving.  In this 
case, our growth measure would underestimate the amount of academic improvement that 
really occurred.  While California does not report what percent of students remain in a 
sixth grade cohort from year to year, it reported what percent of students are continuously 
enrolled at a school from early October to spring testing as recently as 2013.  The median 
score was always near 95%, reflecting the fact that most schools have relatively stable 
student populations. 
Analyses and Results 
The primary analysis is a difference-in-differences research design.  The first 
difference is temporal: outcomes before the suspension ban compared to outcomes after 
the suspension ban.  In this case, the dependent variable is change in middle school 
academic growth.  The second difference is the comparison between various groups of 
schools, depending on the particular hypothesis under consideration.  While H1 and H2 
  
54 
compare LAUSD schools to schools in other parts of California, H3 compares groups of 
schools within LAUSD. 
Table 1 shows that LAUSD schools differ from other California schools on a 
variety of observed characteristics.  This means the suspension ban was not applied to 
schools in an “as if” random process, so we cannot consider the analyses of H1 or H2 to 
be natural experiments (Dunning 2012).  H1 is particularly problematic because LAUSD 
enacted a variety of other policies during the period that could explain differences 
between the academic growth of LAUSD compared to the rest of the state.  H2a and H2b 
alleviate this problem somewhat by looking at schools based on whether or not they gave 
defiance suspensions in 2013. 
However, Table 1 also shows that LAUSD schools were very similar on observed 
characteristics regardless of the number of suspensions they gave in 2013.  This allows us 
to argue that the suspension ban was applied to schools within LAUSD in an “as-if” 
random process, allowing us to consider the analysis for H3 a natural experiment.  The 
case for a natural experiment is strengthened by the fact that schools within LAUSD were 
subject to any other policy changes that the board enacted between 2013 and 2015.  
Additionally, LAUSD schools share other unobserved characteristics with one another 
that they may not share with schools in other parts of California.  For all these reasons, 
the comparison among schools in LAUSD should be considered a natural experiment, 
making this a very strong test of the relationship between suspension reduction and 
academic growth. 
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To test H1, we compare all LAUSD middle schools to all other middle schools 
statewide.  Figure 9 shows that LAUSD schools experienced a 16% standard deviation 
decrease while other California middle schools remained essentially static.  However, this 
comparison includes schools that were not impacted by the suspension ban because they 
did not utilize defiance suspensions.  The middle columns support H2a by revealing a 
bigger gap between LAUSD (-22%) and the rest of the state (-1%).  The right-hand 
columns show very slight changes in academic growth for schools – in and out of 
LAUSD – that did not give defiance suspensions.  This supports H2b, providing 
confidence that the gap we see between LAUSD and the rest of the state is driven by this 
suspension ban as opposed to other possible factors.  Bivariate regressions reveal that the 
difference between LAUSD and non-LAUSD schools is almost statistically significant 
for H1 (p=0.17) and H2a (p=0.12), supporting the strand of the literature arguing that a 
sudden drop in suspensions harms academic growth. 
 
Figure 9: Change in Academic Growth by Policy Treatment 
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Figure 10: Within LAUSD, Change in Academic Growth by Pre-Policy Number of Suspensions 
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schools in each category prevent any of the differences from being statistically 
significant.  However, this comparison of schools within LAUSD is a natural experiment: 
the schools are very similar in observed and unobserved characteristics, with the 
exception of the extent to which they were impacted by the suspension ban (because they 
gave different numbers of defiance suspensions in 2013).  Combined with hypothesis 2, 
these findings alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias, the concern that some other 
factor caused the observed drops in academic growth.  In order for an omitted variable to 
explain the story, it would need to both be related to changes in academic growth and the 
number of suspensions based on defiance schools issued in 2013. 
Threats to Inference 
This paper falls short of the ideal of an experimental design leading to statistically 
significant results.  However, additional analyses alleviate the main threats to inference.  
One major concern is measurement error in the outcome, change in academic growth.  
Each measurement of growth covers two years and reflects one cohort of students.  
Student mobility causes grade level cohorts on which growth is calculated change by 
unknown amounts over time at different schools.  Academic growth from 2013 to 2015 
spans two different assessment systems and standards, leading to concerns that we may 
be measuring variations in teacher preparation for this change more than changes in 
student learning. 
Two analyses address this issue.  One involves converting the academic 
performance of each school in the state into a percentile from 1 to 100 in both 2013 and 
2015.  This is the closest we can get to a consistent measure of achievement given the 
  
58 
change in assessment systems during this time.  We then calculate the change in 
academic percentile from 2013 to 2015 for each school.  Replicating graphs 4 and 5 with 
this academic measure reveals the same trends reported in this chapter.  The other 
analysis concerns suspension bans that took place after California adopted new 
assessments in 2014-15 and is described below. 
A second major concern is omitted variable bias.  As explained above, the 
difference-in-differences methodology partly addresses this concern.  By looking at the 
change over time, we hold all time-invariant factors constant.  The top-down nature of the 
suspension ban provides additional assurances; the intended drop in suspensions is 
unrelated to sudden changes in students’ lives that would also cause a drop in academic 
growth.  Additionally, we run six regressions to see if school-level traits can explain the 
strongest finding, hypothesis 2A.  We control for prior academic growth, racial 
demographics, non-racial demographics, and then all those factors combined.  The 
variable for being in LAUSD always has a negative coefficient (i.e. LAUSD schools 
experienced decreased academic growth), and is similar in size across most models.  The 
exceptions are models 3 and 5, which include non-racial demographics: the percent of 
students who are low-income, English Learners, and students with disabilities.  Model 6 
shows that when these non-racial demographics are excluded, the LAUSD dummy 
variable is negative and statistically significant. 
The rows for H2A in Table 1 show that LAUSD has relatively high percentages 
of students in all three of these non-racial demographic categories.  It is possible that 
these factors caused approximately half of LAUSD’s relative decrease in academic 
  
59 
growth.  However, it is also possible that the correlation between these factors and being 
in LAUSD is coincidental.  
Table 2: OLS Regressions as Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 2A 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
In LAUSD -0.209 
[0.133] 
-0.235** 
[0.107] 
-0.116 
[0.139] 
-0.231* 
[0.138] 
-0.078 
[0.112] 
-0.197* 
[0.109] 
Additional 
Independent 
Variables 
None Prior 
Academic 
Growth 
(2011 to 
2013) 
Non-Racial 
Demographics 
(% with 
Disabilities,  
% Low-Income,  
% English 
Learner) 
Racial 
Demographics 
(% African 
American,  
% Asian,  
% Latino,  
% Other) 
All All but 
Non-Racial 
Demo-
graphics 
Observations 946 946 946 946 946 946 
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.359 0.007 0.003 0.387 0.369 
Notes:  The outcome variable is change in growth from 2011-2013 to 2013-2015.  Observations include all 
schools with change in growth data and at least one suspension based on defiance in 2013: 79 in LAUSD 
and 867 not in LAUSD.  Demographic data reflects all test-takers at each school in spring of 2015. 
The final concern is selection bias: LAUSD schools were not randomly selected 
to impose a suspension ban.  We are assuming that LAUSD schools are comparable to all 
other California schools.  However, LAUSD is different from the rest of the California in 
many ways, and perhaps some of those unique characteristics allowed the suspension ban 
to harm academic growth.  If another school district implemented a suspension ban, 
would academic growth be similarly hurt?  Additionally, the LAUSD analysis only 
includes middle schools.  Would suspension bans also be harmful in elementary grades? 
Four subsequent suspension bans in California suggest that the experience of Los 
Angeles in generalizable.36  First, San Francisco Unified School District adopted the 
same suspension ban in 2014, one year after Los Angeles.  We can conduct a similar 
                                                        
36 A fifth suspension ban took place in Azusa Unified School District, but the paper cannot similarly 
measure the impact of that ban because it was implemented over three years. 
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difference-in-differences analysis for San Francisco, comparing 2011-2013 growth to 
2013-15 growth.  Students in San Francisco only experienced the ban during 2014-15, 
not 2013-14, so they effectively received half the “dosage” of the ban that students in Los 
Angeles received.  Nevertheless, columns one and two in Table 3 show a significant 
decline in academic growth compared to the rest of the state, even after controlling for 
prior growth rate and demographics.  While the coefficient is even larger than the 
observed impact in Los Angeles, the confidence interval is fairly wide because of the 
small number of schools. 
Table 3: Four Subsequent Suspension Bans 
 San Francisco 
Unified (n=20)  
vs. CA 
Pasadena Unified 
(n=30)  
vs. CA 
Oakland Unified 
(n=134)  
vs. CA 
CA K-3 Sites:  
Some (n=21)  
vs. No (n-37) 
Suspensions 
Experienced 
Ban 
-0.890*** 
[0.268] 
-0.506*** 
[0.214] 
-2.027 
[2.127] 
-1.372 
[2.096] 
-5.328*** 
[1.175] 
-2.784** 
[1.196] 
-4.347 
[4.486] 
-4.503 
[4.938] 
Additional 
Independent 
Variables? 
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1181 1181 7040 7037 7040 7037 58 58 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.426 0.000 0.036 0.003 0.036 -0.001 -0.035 
Notes:  The outcome variable for San Francisco Unified is change in growth from 2011-2013 to 2013-
2015.  The outcome variable for Pasadena and Oakland is actual academic growth minus expected growth 
after controlling for prior average scale score.  The outcome variable for CA K-3 schools is the change in 
third grade average ELA scale score.  Additional Independent Variables include test taker demographics 
(% low-income, % students with disabilities, % English Learners, % African American, % Asian, % Latino, 
% Other) and prior achievement – or in the case of San Francisco, prior growth. 
The next bans were in Pasadena in December 2014 and Oakland in 2015.  These 
occurred after the state transitioned to new assessments, which eliminates concerns that 
the assessment switch somehow biases the results.  However, the bans occurred during or 
immediately after the first year California administered its new assessment.  A 
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difference-in-indifference analysis is not possible because we cannot measure growth 
before these bans.  Therefore, the best we can do is compare their academic growth 
during 2015-16 to other schools statewide. 
Pasadena schools experienced the suspension ban for roughly half of 2014-15 and 
then all of 2015-16.  Growth is based on the difference between the current year’s 
achievement (2015-16) and the prior year’s achievement (2014-15).  That means the 
Pasadena analyses in Table 3 are comparing a full year of suspension ban to a half year of 
the suspension ban.  In contrast, Oakland schools only experienced the suspension ban 
during 2015-16.  The Oakland analyses therefore compare a full year of suspension ban 
to a year with no suspension ban.  We would expect the Pasadena “Experienced Ban” 
variable to be approximately half the size of the Oakland one.  The results in Table 3 fit 
that expectation exactly.  The fact that the Pasadena “Experienced Ban” variables are not 
statistically significant is unsurprising given that the effect is smaller (as we would 
expect) and there are only 30 Pasadena schools in the analysis.  
Finally, the entire state of California banned suspensions for students in grades K-
3 in 2015.  To analyze the impact on academics, we exploit the fact that just over a third 
of K-3 schools (21 of 58) gave defiance suspensions in 2014-15, before the ban took 
effect.  In the analysis of LAUSD, we see that the impact of the suspension ban was 
concentrated in schools that previous issued defiance suspensions.  If the suspension ban 
harms academic growth even for third graders, then we would expect those 21 schools to 
grow less from 2014-15 to 2015-16 than the other 37 K-3 schools.  That is exactly what 
we see.  The 21 K-3 schools most impacted by the suspension ban improved their percent 
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Met by 2.5% (32.2% to 34.7%).  That is only half as much improvement as the 37 other 
K-3 schools (44.0% to 49.1%).37  Table 3 shows that this gap is not statistically 
significant, but that is primarily a function of the small number of schools in the analysis.  
The fact that the “Experienced Ban” coefficient is similar in both K-3 columns indicates 
that the gap is not the result of differences in demographics or prior achievement. 
Analyses of these four subsequent suspension bans are not as robust as LAUSD’s.  
With the exception of San Francisco, we cannot conduct a full difference-in-differences 
analysis because we lack data to measure the change in academic growth.  It is possible 
that Pasadena, Oakland, and the twenty-one K-3 schools that gave defiance suspensions 
would have had relatively low growth even without the suspension ban – for reasons not 
accounted for by the independent variables in the Table 3 regressions.  But the 
cumulative evidence makes that exceedingly unlikely.  The analyses of LAUSD and 
these four subsequent bans combine to form a strong case that suspension bans have a 
significant and negative causal impact on academic growth. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Despite lingering uncertainty, the evidence in this paper is important for three 
primary reasons.  First, it is closer to the experimental ideal than the current literature.  It 
is a significant improvement on work that correlates suspension rates and achievement 
(Losen et al. 2015).  It does not rely on matched comparisons between students who get 
suspended and students who do not, as does Arcia (2006).  Nor does it rely on the 
assumption that natural fluctuations in suspension rates cause subsequent changes in 
                                                        
37 We see similar but slightly smaller gaps when we measure achievement in Math or use average scale 
scores. 
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academic performance, as does Perry and Morris (2014).  This paper relies on the 
LAUSD board decision to ban suspensions based on defiance to impose a sudden, 
intended shift in suspension rates among a particular subset of California schools.  The 
standard of quality for social science research is not perfection, but providing new 
information with the best available method (Gerring 2012).38 
This paper also complements recent research on discipline reform.  Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania saw a decrease in academic performance after its reforms (Steinberg and 
Lacoe 2017).  New York City saw a worsening school climate after discipline reforms 
during the 2014-15 school year, with many more schools seeing higher shares of students 
reporting violence, drug use, gang activity, and disrespect (Eden 2017).  Teacher surveys 
from school districts as diverse as Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Syracuse, New York, and 
Oklahoma City all suggest that discipline reforms make the average teacher feel less safe 
(Eden 2018).  The harm to school climate is likely an important mechanism by which 
suspension bans harm academic growth.  As school climate deteriorates, it becomes more 
difficult for teachers to teach and students to learn.  In at least one district, discipline 
reform appears to have increased teacher turnover (D’Orio 2018).  This, too, may harm 
academic growth. 
                                                        
38 Student-level data could enable a more accurate estimate of the LAUSD suspension ban’s impact.  
Ideally, the cohorts used to measure two-year growth would only include students continuously enrolled in 
schools during that time.  Additionally, exact counts of the numbers of students – ideally in those cohorts, 
not the entire school – who received out-of-school suspensions for defiance would allow the calculation of 
2013 suspension rates for the same groups of students for whom we measure academic growth.  Student-
level data would enable use of a multilevel model and make it more likely that estimates are statistically 
significant. 
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This chapter’s results have implications for the theoretical disagreement within 
the literature.  None of the analyses support the more prominent strand of the literature 
claiming that sudden reductions in suspensions will cause academic growth.  In contrast, 
all of the analyses provide evidence in favor of the strand of the literature claiming that 
sudden reductions in suspensions will reduce academic growth.  Perry and Morris’ (2014) 
finding that reducing suspensions would improve academic growth for non-suspended 
students appears to be driven by omitted variable bias.  Unmeasured factors that caused 
drops in suspension rates in their sample also caused increases in academic growth.  
Arcia’s (2006) finding that suspensions academically harm suspended students may or 
may not suffer from similar bias.  Our analysis of LAUSD lacks the data granularity to 
differentiate between types of students.  It could be that the suspension ban in fact 
improved academic growth for students who would have been suspended and 
simultaneously harmed academic growth for all other students.  However, research on 
discipline reform from Philadelphia found that previously suspended students did not 
experience improved academic growth after the policy change (Steinberg and Lacoe 
2017).  If this is also true in LAUSD, the implication would be that suspensions by 
themselves may not significantly harm academic growth for suspended students. 
Such potential problems with previous research suggests a possible need to re-
conceptualize suspensions.  The literature has assumed that suspensions have important 
causal power.  For example, suspensions are seen as a piece of the school-to-prison 
pipeline because suspensions are assumed to cause dropouts, which then facilitates 
trouble with law enforcement and prison.  According to this theory, suspension bans 
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should cause substantial declines in dropout rates.  Future research will need to test the 
relationship between suspension bans and dropout rates, but the preliminary data does not 
look promising.  While suspension bans preceded declines in dropout rates in Los 
Angeles and San Francisco, bans were followed by only a minor reduction in dropout 
rates in Oakland and an increased dropout rate in Pasadena.  Additionally, it could be that 
the declines we see in Los Angeles and San Francisco are the result of other changes in 
district policy.  This suggests that at least some suspensions may be better conceptualized 
not as a root cause, but as a symptom of other issues.  While suspension bans address the 
symptom of suspensions, bans will not reliably improve student outcomes if the root 
causes remain untouched. 
Table 4: Annual Dropout Rates for Districts that Banned Suspensions 
 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 
Los Angeles 6.1 6.3 3.9* 4.3 3.4 
San Francisco 4 6.3 7.4 1.4* 2.5 
Pasadena 5.5 4.5 4.7 3.4 4.6* 
Oakland 8.5 7.4 5.3 6.7 5.8* 
Note: In each row, the number with an asterisk indicates the first year after the suspension ban. 
The second reason this evidence is important is that the impact on academic 
growth might be substantial.  A full school year of academic growth is roughly equivalent 
to one standard deviation; the analyses suggest the suspension ban had an impact of 
approximately 20% of a standard deviation on schools that gave those suspensions.  If 
true, this would be an enormous impact.  This would be a larger impact than shifting from 
a bottom quartile teacher to a top quartile teacher (2012 Gathering Feedback for 
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Teaching).39  The same suspension ban would have been imposed statewide in 2012 if 
California Governor Gerry Brown had not vetoed it (Watanabe 2013a).  Although there is 
some uncertainty around this 20% estimate, the fact that it could have such a large 
negative impact should make people very hesitant to encourage the adoption of 
suspension bans.  Even significant amounts of money simultaneously spent on teacher 
training in behavior management, as in Oakland, does not appear to prevent the academic 
harm. 
This should give pause to the variety of actors promoting suspension bans.  At 
best, the lack of statistical significance in some analyses means that LAUSD’s suspension 
ban may have had no causal impact.  There is no evidence allowing us to say that the ban 
improved academic growth, and the totality of evidence heavily favors the conclusion 
that the ban harmed academic growth.  Furthermore, bans will harm growth in schools 
that previously gave defiance suspensions, and these schools disproportionately serve 
African America and Latino students.  In other words, suspension bans appear to widen 
the racial achievement gap.  Bans had the benefit of being simple to implement, had 
virtually no immediate financial cost, and produced immediate results.  Other approaches 
to suspension and dropout reduction will be relatively complicated, cost time and money 
(e.g. for staff training), and may take several years to see results.  Nevertheless, this 
approach seems much preferable to widening the racial achievement gap, harming 
academic growth for a huge number of students, and not reliably reducing dropout rates. 
                                                        
39 The Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project rigorously evaluated the performance of nearly 3,000 
teachers.  It found that teacher performance is most accurately predicted by a combination of classroom 
observations, student surveys, and value added measures from standardized tests. 
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The final reason this evidence is important is that school discipline is an active 
area of policy debate and experimentation.  Betsy Devos, President Donald Trump’s pick 
for Education Secretary, has held meetings to discuss whether to change the Department 
of Education’s stance on school discipline.  Conservative groups are advocating that the 
federal government should resume its limited role of investigating particular complaints 
of unfair practices.  This would be quite a departure from the Obama-era policy of 
pressuring school districts to reduce suspensions if rates between racial groups were not 
equitable.  This paper indirectly weighs in on this debate: if the federal government wants 
school districts to reduce suspensions, districts should also evaluate their changes to 
ensure that their efforts reliably reduce dropout rates and do not have the unintended 
consequence of harming academic growth. 
What should districts do that have already implemented suspension bans?  
LAUSD School board member Richard Vladovic voted to ban suspensions based on 
defiance “as an experiment, saying he would be ‘the first to stop it’ if it proved disruptive 
to learning” (Watanabe 2013c).  This brings up an important point: just because a 
suspension ban decreases academic growth does not mean that reversing a ban will cause 
an increase.  Unfortunately, it is probably easier to harm academic growth than to help it.  
Also, it is possible that training in restorative justice or other behavior management 
practices might cause an increase in academic growth without having to resume giving 
  
68 
suspensions for defiance.40  Districts would be wise to try a variety of more gradual 
options, evaluate their impacts, and then make an informed choice as to how to proceed. 
This highlights the broader need for policy evaluation at the school district level.  
School board members and district leaders rarely know with certainty how a policy is 
likely to impact academic growth, and they often do not conduct evaluations of the 
policies they implement.  An array of factors contribute to this problem, ranging from the 
relatively weak research base in education to the political cost of having to admit that 
past decisions led to bad outcomes.  We are far from making evaluation a routine 
component of district policy decisions.  The aim of this paper is to nudge us in that 
direction.  Future researchers may find ways to reduce suspensions that also increase 
academic growth.  Even more important would be if future researchers regularly help to 
inform school district leaders as they make important decisions concerning the education 
of our children. 
                                                        
40 Recent research finds that restorative justice training led to further reductions in suspension rates 
(Hashim et al. 2018).  Future research will need to look at the impact of this training on academic growth. 
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THE GROUPING DILEMMA: HOW BETWEEN-CLASS ABILITY GROUPING 
IMPACTS GROWTH AND EQUITY 
Overview 
Between-class ability grouping is the practice of using prior academic 
achievement to place students within a grade in different classes for either a single 
subject or the full school day.41  The core curriculum remains constant, but higher ability 
classes often cover content at greater depth or breadth because they can move at a faster 
pace.  United States public schools have utilized between-class ability grouping in 
various forms for over a century, starting in Santa Barbara, California sometime soon 
after 1900 and Detroit in 1919 (Otto 1941; Courtis 1925). 
It is helpful to conceptualize between-class ability grouping as the midpoint 
between two other methods of sorting students.  One is within-class ability grouping, 
which occurs when teachers sort students in a single class into groups and then provide 
distinct instruction to each group at different times.  This is a version of differentiated 
instruction.  Such groups tend to be extremely flexible, changing as frequently as the 
teacher can reevaluate students’ abilities.  The other extreme is tracking, where students 
sorted into different classes that experience different curricula.  Tracked groups tend to be 
very inflexible because even if students are motivated to change tracks, they have missed 
curricular content that the other track covered.  Between-class ability grouping is less 
flexible than within-class grouping but more flexible than tracking.  The practice gives 
                                                        
41 Between-class ability grouping is also known as ability-grouped class assignment (Slavin 1987), 
multilevel grouping (Kulik and Kulik 1992), multitrack grouping (Miles 1954), and XYZ classes (Kulik 
1992).  The most common term in current use is “between-class ability grouping,” so we use either 
that term or simply “ability grouping” with no qualifier to refer to this practice. 
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the same curriculum to all students like within-class grouping, but it separates students 
into distinct classes like tracking.  In other words, between-class ability grouping is 
differentiated instruction at the classroom level. 
For nearly all of its history, the literature has concluded that between-class ability 
grouping has no impact on academic growth (e.g. Miller and Otto 1930, Ekstrom 1961, 
Kulik 1992, Steenbergen-Hu et al. 2016).  However, research from the past decade 
suggests that between-class ability grouping increases academic growth (e.g. Duflo et al. 
2011; Collins and Gan 2013).  These researchers posit that the cause is a clustering 
mechanism: decreased classroom dispersion in prior academic ability allows teachers to 
target their instruction more narrowly. 
This paper advances the literature by specifically testing this clustering 
mechanism.  It does so with student-level data from Fortune School of Education, an 
organization that operates a network of elementary and middle charter schools that 
adopted an evolving policy of ability grouping during the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school 
years.  Approximately half of the observations are of students experiencing between-class 
ability grouping; the other half are of students who were not sorted.42  However, the 
primary independent variable is not whether or not there is between-class ability 
grouping, but the degree to which students in a class are clustered by prior ability.  There 
is significant variation in clustering across classes whether or not they experienced 
between-class ability grouping.  Instead of comparing a treated group to a control, this 
                                                        
42 In the sample, students in grade 1 were never sorted into between-class ability groups and 
students in grade 2 were only sorted in one of the four trimesters.  Students in grades 3 through 8 
could not be sorted when there was only one class in that grade at that site.  Every grade had some 
students who were not sorted. 
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paper exploits variation in the strength of the treatment.  This allows us to partially 
assuage concerns of omitted variable bias because we do not need treatment and control 
groups to be equivalent on all observed and unobserved characteristics.  We exploit the 
fluctuating strength of the treatment, which is hopefully quasi-random, for the same 
students over time. 
Across a range of models and specifications, we find a substantially small but 
statistically significant effect: a one standard deviation decrease in clustering causes a 7% 
decrease in overall academic growth.  Contrary to the expectations of the literature, 
between-class ability grouping slightly harms overall academic growth. 
However, between-class ability grouping also improves equity by boosting 
growth for the lowest-ability students.  When between-class ability grouping is not 
implemented, students in the third quartile benefit the most from classroom dispersion.  
This suggests that teachers confronting classrooms with wide variation in student ability 
focus their instruction at students in the third quartile, just above the class average.  When 
there is ability grouping, students in the bottom quartile see a substantial boost in 
academic growth, helping them catch up to their peers.  This is probably because teachers 
with only lower-ability students in a classroom are able to focus their instruction at a 
level that is much more appropriate for students in the bottom quartile.  Unfortunately, 
between-class ability grouping also lowers growth for students in the top quartiles.  If 
schools were able to implement between-class ability grouping in a way that did not 
decrease growth for higher-ability students, this practice would improve equity as well as 
overall academic growth.  
  
72 
The paper proceeds in four parts.  First we provide background on ability groups, 
both the history of the practice in the US and how this practice came to be adopted at the 
network of Fortune School of Education charter schools we analyze.  Then we discuss the 
competing evidence in the extant literature about the impact of ability groups.  Third, we 
describe the data and analyses used to evaluate the hypothesized mechanism of ability 
groups: decreased classroom dispersion in prior ability allows teachers to target their 
instruction more narrowly.  Finally, we discuss the limitations of the results as well as the 
implications for practitioners.  
Background 
 The first recorded use of between-class ability grouping is from an undated year 
soon after 1900 in Santa Barbara, California (Otto 1941).  However, it appears that few 
people learned about ability grouping through this or other early adoptions by relatively 
small school districts.  Instead, Detroit popularized the practice after adopting it in 1919 
(Courtis 1925).  Detroit school leaders used standardized assessments to divide first 
graders into three types of all-day classes: the top 20%, the middle 60%, and the bottom 
20%.  This particular format became the most common form of ability grouping in the 
United States (Kulik 1992). 
 Unfortunately, we have limited data about the proportion of schools nationally 
that have utilized between-class ability groups.  National surveys have either focused on 
within-class ability groups or posed questions that could apply equally to partial sorting, 
between-class ability groups, or even tracking.  The best we can do is look at those trends 
and speculate on what that is likely to mean for between-class ability groups.  The earliest 
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data we have is from 1961, when a survey found that 80% of elementary schools utilized 
within-class ability grouping in English (Austin and Morrison 1961).  This rate appears to 
be relatively consistent up through the mid-1980s (Loveless 2013).  However, the rate 
was only 28% in 1998 when the National Association of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
began surveying fourth grade teachers about their use of within-class ability groups.  In 
that year, another 33% of fourth grade students were in reading groups based on 
“interest,” “diversity,” or “other” factors.  The remaining 39% were not placed into 
groups at all. 
 Did within-class ability grouping in elementary English classes really decline 
from 80% to 28% from the mid-1980s to 1998?  NAEP surveys about eighth grade 
English classes suggest that such a change is plausible.  The eighth grade survey asked 
school leaders whether students were “typically assigned to classes by ability.”  
Unfortunately, this phrasing could reflect three distinct practices: partial sorting, full 
between-class ability grouping, or tracking (if the classes had different curricula).  We 
will say the survey reflects “sorting/tracking” to reflect this ambiguity.  Nevertheless, in 
the earliest survey from 1990, 60% of students were sorted/tracked in English classes.  
The rate dropped to 50% in 1992 and 37% in 1994.  By 1998, only 32% of eighth grade 
students experienced English sorting/tracking.  Since the survey reflects multiple 
practices, it is likely that less than 32% of eighth graders experienced between-class 
ability grouping in that year.  That is very similar to the fourth grade ability grouping rate 
(28%) in 1998. 
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 Why did practices in both these grades experience such sharp declines?  Loveless 
argues that the media published criticisms of these practices during that period, and that 
“educators are aware of public debates and are influenced when particular school 
practices become controversial” (2013, p. 19).  As evidence, Loveless calculates the 
number of times “ability grouping” was mentioned each year in the magazine Education 
Week.  While most years mention that term no more than three times, the term was 
mentioned between five and twenty times each year from 1989 to 1998 (Loveless 2013).  
This is exactly the timeframe in which surveys show that eighth grade sorting/tracking 
declined, as well as when fourth grade within-class ability grouping declined. 
 After 1998, however, the practices rebounded.  NAEP data shows within-class 
ability grouping steadily increasing from 28% of fourth graders in 1998 to 71% in 2009.43  
This is almost a return to the 80% level observed in the mid-1980s and previous decades.  
Such an increase is especially impressive given the fact that within-class ability grouping 
tends to be most common in first grade, declining in use as students move to higher 
elementary grades (McPartland et al. 1987).  Therefore, the NAEP survey is likely to 
underestimate the percent of US elementary students who experience within-class ability 
grouping.  We only have comparable eighth grade sorting/tracking data from one year: 
43% in 2003.  The rate for fourth grade ability grouping in that year was 47%, suggesting 
that sorting/tracking were at least on a similar trajectory from 1998 to 2003.  NAEP 
surveys did not ask about sorting/tracking after 2003, so we do not know whether or not 
this trend continued.  Even if the trend did continue like within-class ability grouping, we 
                                                        
43 NAEP surveys after 2009 have not asked about ability grouping. 
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would not know whether this reflects partial sorting, between-class ability grouping, or 
tracking. 
 The remainder of this section describes how Fortune School of Education (FSE), 
a charter management organization in California, implemented between-class ability 
grouping.  While the responses of the school leaders and teachers in this system are only 
anecdotal evidence, it suggests that between-class ability grouping was far from a 
widespread, accepted practice by 2016. 
In the 2016-17 school year, FSE operated six charter schools serving primarily 
low-income African-American and Latino students from Kindergarten to eighth grade.  In 
an effort to increase academic growth, FSE central office leaders and principals decided 
to group students by ability into English classes in grades three through eight.  At the 
beginning of the 2016-17 school year, schedulers sorted students into English classes 
based on their score on either (1) the interim assessment from the end of the prior school 
year or, if that was unavailable, (2) a placement exam given at the very beginning of the 
school year.  The lowest level class was called “Rising,” the highest was called 
“Benchmark,” and the middle level (when there were three classes in a grade) was called 
“Strategic.”  When grades were divided into two classes, schedulers tried to find one cut 
score (e.g. the 40th percentile) for each school that would result in reasonable class sizes 
for all grades.  Principals determined when the cut score needed to be changed because 
certain class sizes were too large or small.  Principals needed to obtain central office 
approval in order to place students in a different class. 
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Elementary students were in mixed ability groups for all other subjects and then 
moved into ability groups for English class.  Middle school students took all their classes 
with their English ability groups.  All ability groups utilized the same curricula and 
administered the same interim assessments at the end of each trimester.  Scores on those 
interim assessments could result in students moving into a higher or lower level English 
class for the next trimester; an average of 17% of students changed levels in each of the 
four transitions for which we have data.  By design, lower level classes had more 
instructional aides and fewer students.  During the school year, all English teachers 
received the same professional development regardless of whether they taught lower or 
higher level classes. 
This shift to ability groups was controversial internally.  Recent academic 
research (Collins and Gan 2013) as well as anecdotal evidence from some high-
performing schools suggested that this could result in higher academic growth, especially 
for low-achieving students, by allowing teachers to target their instruction more 
precisely.  However, many FSE principals and central office staff had been taught that 
such sorting was akin to tracking and would harm student growth.  Additionally, staff 
understandably were concerned about unintended negative consequences: lower-
achieving classes could suffer from lower expectations, lower quality resources, and 
psychological stigma.  FSE therefore attempted to implement ability groups in a way that 
avoided or minimized these potential problems.  Use of standard curricula and 
assessments helped to ensure that all students were held to the same high expectations.  
The fact that lower-level classes were smaller and had instructional aides ensured that 
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these students received a resource advantage compared to higher-level classes.  Class 
names (Rising, Strategic, and Benchmark) and the fluidity of the system attempted to 
prevent negative psychological impact on students.  Instead of feeling stigmatized and 
stuck, students in low level English classes could feel comfortable or motivated to 
advance into a more difficult English class the next trimester. 
Enrollment patterns dictated the number of ability groups in every grade (third 
through eighth) at each school.  FSE charter schools were still building up to full 
enrollment because they were relatively new – between two and seven years old.  
Therefore, schools had anywhere from one to three classes per grade.  Grades with only 
enough students for one class could not implement ability groups at all; grades with two 
or three classes would have two or three ability groups, respectively.  In other words, 
enrollment patterns conditioned the implementation of ability groups. 
FSE made three policy changes for the 2017-18 school year.  Two were relatively 
minor.  One was to use ability groups in grade two as well as grades three through eight.  
The other change was to more rigorously incorporate class size into the placement 
process.  Schedulers still started by trying to find one cut score (e.g. the 40th percentile) 
for each school that would result in reasonable sizes for Rising and Benchmark classes.  
However, instead of relying on principals to determine when to adjust for class size, we 
automated the process with a two part policy.  First, Rising classes had to be smaller than 
Benchmark classes.  Second, the difference in size between Rising and Benchmark 
classes could be no more than 10 students.  This new policy essentially formalized the 
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input that principals provided during the first year of implementation, thereby saving 
principal time. 
The most substantial change was to have teachers specialize in particular subjects.  
The policy was called “departmentalization,” and it applied in grades two and higher 
whenever there were two classes in a grade at an elementary school.44  Instead of 
teaching all subjects, staff taught two subjects: either English and social studies or math 
and science.  They instructed the Rising class for half the day and the Benchmark class 
for the other half.  This had a number of benefits.  First, it substantially reduced lesson 
planning time because teachers led two similar lessons each day.  Second, teachers were 
able to focus on their stronger content areas.  Many teachers prefer one pair of subjects to 
the other, and departmentalization allowed them to build on their strengths.  Third, this 
avoided the concern that the lower ability class may have a weaker instructor than the 
other; all students were taught the same subjects by the same teachers. 
Changes between the 2016-17 and 2017-18 school years highlights an important 
theoretical point: ability grouping can be implemented in a variety of ways.  
Implementation details could have important effects on academic growth.  Other schools 
may implement ability grouping in a very different way, perhaps leading to significantly 
better or worse results.  However, the main purpose of this paper is not to evaluate the 
entire practice of ability grouping.  Instead, this paper aims to evaluate the proposed 
clustering mechanism that connects ability grouping to academic growth: decreased 
classroom dispersion in academic ability allows teachers to better target their instruction.  
                                                        
44 In fall 2017-18, there were no schools that had more than two classes for grades two through eight. 
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It is a strength of this paper that the data includes classes that experienced different 
implementations of ability groups as well as classes that experienced no ability groups at 
all.  We will analyze these contexts separately to see if the clustering mechanism only 
appears in certain contexts.  But before we get to the analyses, we need to look at the 
existing literature to see what evidence exists to support or oppose the existence of a 
clustering mechanism. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 The literature presents two competing perspectives on how between-class ability 
grouping impacts academic growth: a dominant view, and a recent view.  The dominant 
view has been that that there is no significant effect on student learning.  The recent view 
is that between-class ability grouping has a positive effect on student learning.  
Proponents of the recent view claim that the mechanism underlying their findings is a 
decrease in classroom dispersion.  They hypothesize that by decreasing the range of 
academic ability in a classroom, between-class ability grouping allows teachers to target 
their instruction more narrowly for their students, thereby increasing academic growth.  
The main contribution of this paper is to directly measure and analyze this mechanism. 
Miller and Otto (1930) first articulated the dominant view after reviewing twenty 
studies from the 1920s.  Decades later, Ekstrom (1961) reached the same conclusion 
based on nine studies.  Slavin (1987) and Kulik (1992) also find a null effect in their 
separate reviews of over fifty studies.45  Most recently and comprehensively, 
                                                        
45 This is corroborated by a review of the ability grouping literature in both the United States and 
Great Britain (Wynne and Malcolm 1999). 
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Steenbergen-Hu et al. (2016) synthesize 13 meta-analyses to conclude that between-class 
ability grouping has no significant effect. 
One potential concern is that these reviews include studies of grouping across a 
wide range of grades and subjects.  It is possible that the overall null finding masks a real 
effect when grouping occurs in English classes at the elementary or middle school level, 
the focus of this paper.  Table 5 summarizes the only five studies that share that focus.  
The results is the same: three find a positive overall effect and two find a negative effect.  
The average effect size is an insignificant -0.02. 
Table 5: Analyses of Elementary/Middle English Class Ability Grouping 
Study Effect 
Size 
Grade(s) 
Analyzed 
Methodology 
Berkun, Swanson, & 
Sawyer (1966) 
0.40 3-5 
Grouped classes compared to non-grouped classes in 
nearby schools, adjusted for initial ability 
Bremer (1958) -0.10 1 Grouped students matched to non-grouped students 
from the subsequent year in the same schools 
Moses (1966) 0.07 4-6 Grouped students matched with non-grouped students 
in nearby schools 
Nichols (1969) -0.95 1 Grouped students matched with non-grouped students 
in nearby schools 
Tobin (1966) 0.46 2-6 Grouped students compared to non-grouped students 
from previous years in the same schools 
Note: Table is adapted from Kulik (1992). 
 However, close examination of those five studies reveals significant 
methodological concerns.  The most prominent problem with these studies is omitted 
variable bias.  While the analyses control for students’ initial ability and sometimes a few 
additional variables, many other factors could differ between the comparison groups.  
Berkun et al. (1966) compares classes from different schools and uses statistical 
adjustments in an effort to compensate for different average initial abilities.  Moses 
(1966) and Nichols (1969) are slightly more rigorous, using student-level matching to 
  
81 
compare students at different schools.  But all three analyses rest on the assumption that 
teacher, school, or uncontrolled student effects do not significantly bias their effect size.  
The two remaining studies take a different approach, making comparisons over time to 
the same schools and teachers (Bremer 1958; Tobin 1966).  This controls for teacher and 
school effects, but it introduces the possibility that temporal effects bias their results.  
Additionally, differences between students not reflected by initial ability remain a 
concern.  
In opposition to this traditional strand of the literature, two recent studies argue 
that ability groups may cause increases in academic growth.  The more rigorous analysis 
is Duflo et al. (2011), which conducts a randomized controlled trial in Kenya.  
Researchers provided an additional teacher for 121 schools that had only one first grade 
class, and then randomly divided those schools into two groups: 60 grouped students by 
ability into two first grade classes, and 61 randomly assigned students to the two classes.  
The 60 schools with grouped classes experienced 0.14 standard deviations more 
academic growth.  This effect was consistent across students with different prior ability 
levels, and it persisted a year after tracking ended.  The authors contend that the primary 
mechanism was that decreased classroom dispersion allowed teachers to more narrowly 
target their instruction. 
While the internal validity of Dulfo et al. (2011) is extremely strong, its external 
validity is limited.  The authors readily acknowledge this, and they admit that addition 
research is necessary to determine the extent to which their findings are generalizable.  
Additionally, they discuss two systemic conditions that are likely to impact ability 
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grouping: initial heterogeneity in student ability, and teacher incentives to focus on 
students at a particular level.  More initial heterogeneity among students would make 
ability grouping more consequential in allowing teachers to target their instruction.  In 
contrast, limited initial heterogeneity would curtail the impact of ability grouping.  
Second, systems that incentivize focus on the highest ability students would likely see the 
benefits of ability grouping go primarily to low ability students.  This is because ability 
grouping would allow teachers of lower ability classes to tailor instruction to their level.  
While these conditions may not hold in the United States in general, the next section 
shows that they hold in much of our sample. 
 The other recent study of ability groups looked at fourth grade students in Dallas 
Independent School District (Collins and Gan 2013).  None of the schools utilized 
between-class ability grouping, so Collins and Gan measure the extent to which students 
are sorted by prior ability into different classes at each school.  This is calculated using 
the difference in means between classes in the same grade; it is correlated with classroom 
dispersion, but quite a distinct measure.  Collins and Gan then look for a relationship 
between the extent of sorting and subsequent academic growth.  In an effort to avoid 
omitted variable bias, they use the extent of sorting in fifth grade as an instrumental 
variable to predict the extent of sorting in fourth grade.  They find positive effects for 
high and low ability students in a range of model specifications.  Following Duflo et al. 
(2011), the authors argue that a clustering mechanism explains their findings.  However, 
Collins and Gan do not specifically test this clustering mechanism, and none of the 
schools explicitly utilized between-class ability grouping.   
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In summary, the literature on between-class ability grouping is divided between a 
dominant view (no significant effect) with weak internal validity and a recent view (a 
positive effect) with weak external validity.  The next section describes our effort to 
advance the literature with an analysis of students at Fortune School of Education (FSE), 
a network of charter schools that implemented between-class ability grouping in ways 
that varied across grades and over time.  Instead of attempting to evaluate between-class 
ability grouping as a whole, we aim to look for the clustering mechanism that the recent 
literature believes underlies its positive impact. 
Data and Analyses 
 We use anonymized student-level data from Fortune School of Education (FSE) 
from all three trimesters of 2016-17 and the first trimester of 2017-18.  Students take an 
assessment at the end of each trimester, and that score is used to re-assign students to 
classes.  We therefore have up to four observations per student, one from each trimester 
in the dataset. 
The data is in a four-tier hierarchical structure.  The bottom tier is composed of 
1,530 students: 311 with one observation (i.e. one trimester), 238 with two, 403 with 
three, and 578 with four.  The result is a total of 4,308 unique data points.  Students are 
nested within 234 distinct English classes, with each class lasting one trimester.  Those 
classes are taught by 75 teachers, who teach one or more of eight possible grades (1 
through 8) and are nested within six schools.  The nested nature of the data along with 
multiple observations over time allow us to control for distinct student, teacher, grade, 
and school effects on academic growth. 
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We have two important independent variables.  One is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not between-class ability grouping occurred.  Between-class ability 
grouping took place for approximately half of the observations; no sorting took place in 
the other half.  Students in grade one were never sorted by ability, and students in grade 
two were only sorted in 2017-18 (for which we have one trimester of data).  Students in 
grades three through eight were sorted as long as there were at least two classes in that 
grade at that school.  Across all schools in our sample, each grade – except for grade one 
– has a mix of sorted and unsorted students. 
The novel independent variable is classroom dispersion, which is the spread of 
prior achievement levels within a classroom.  If this is the only mechanism by which 
between-class ability grouping impacts academic growth, then this variable should be 
significant while the dummy variable should be insignificant.  We measure classroom 
dispersion by calculating the mean deviation of scale scores on the previous interim 
assessment.  This includes all students currently in the class, regardless of which class 
they were in during the prior trimester.  Figure 11 shows that the distribution of 
classroom dispersion is close to normal.  The standard deviation of classroom dispersion 
is 2.5 scale score points, which is exactly the average difference between students who 
experience between-class ability grouping and those who do not (10.1 and 7.6, 
respectively).  The distribution of classroom dispersion is also close to normal when we 
look at only classes where between-class ability grouping occurred or classes where this 
practice did not occur. 
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Figure 11: Histogram of Classroom Dispersion 
 
Focusing on classroom dispersion directly tests the mechanism the recent 
literature argues is at work with between-class ability grouping: teachers can better target 
their instruction the more students are clustered around the same ability level.  
Theoretically, this mechanism should hold true whether or not students are formally 
grouped by ability into classes.  This builds on the insight of Collins and Gan (2013), 
who measure the extent to which classes within a grade are sorted by ability.  While the 
rest of the literature treats between-class ability grouping as a binary, they conceptualize 
it as a continuum.  We conceptualize the mechanism underlying between-class ability 
grouping – classroom dispersion – as a continuum.  While it is possible to partially sort 
students by prior ability, the observations in our sample either were fully sorted or not 
sorted at all. 
For interim assessments, FSE uses the Northwest Evaluation Association’s 
Measure of Academic Progress assessment (i.e. NWEA MAP) in both Reading and Math 
each trimester.  FSE began administering these assessments in the second trimester of the 
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2015-16 school year, so by 2016-17 staff had familiarity with the assessment and 
understood that it would be important for internal decision-making.  NWEA MAP is 
nationally normed and vertically aligned, allowing students in any grade to receive 
achievement scores at any point on the scale.  In every grade level, the distributions of 
NWEA MAP scores in our sample approximate a normal distribution and have a standard 
deviation between 14 and 16.  As expected, the average scale score increases in every 
grade.  NWEA also reports each score as a national percentile ranging from 1 (lowest) to 
99 (highest).  Scores in our sample are fairly evenly distributed across this distribution, 
with two exceptions: a cluster of students in the bottom 5% and a relatively small portion 
of students in the top 5%. 
Our goal is to measure the relationship between classroom dispersion and 
academic growth.  We follow the methodology of value-added models, the best available 
metric of academic growth in the education literature (e.g. Kogan et al. 2016b).46   Value-
added measures of academic growth include the prior scale score as an independent 
variable to predict the outcome – the end of trimester (i.e. current) scale score.  Adding 
additional covariates and controls to the model allows us to see if other factors impact 
academic growth even after accounting for the prior English score. 
In Model 1 of Table 6, we see that classroom dispersion is associated with 
significantly higher academic growth.  Since between-class ability grouping reduces 
                                                        
46 The value-add literature has primarily focused on its controversial use in teacher evaluation.  Using 
value-add estimates for entire grades avoids some concerns, such as sorting difficult-to-teach students into 
particular teachers’ classes (Rothstein 2009).  However, even grade level value-add measures can 
experience significant variation across time (Goldhaber and Hansen 2008) and can be sensitive to the 
assessment used (Lockwood et al. 2007).  On the positive side, value-add measures are highly correlated 
with principal evaluations of teachers (Kimball et al. 2004; Jacob and Lefgren 2008).   
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classroom dispersion (by one standard deviation, on average), this implies that the 
practice lowered growth.  Such a result defies the expectations of the traditional view (no 
effect) and recent view (positive effect) of the literature.  Model 1 also shows that in a 
regression with just these current and prior test scores and classroom dispersion, the 
adjusted R-squared is 0.77 and the coefficient on prior score is 0.86.  Removing 
classroom dispersion (not shown) causes the adjusted R-squared to drop to just 0.76.  As 
the value-added literature would predict, prior and current NWEA MAP scale scores are 
highly correlated with each other.   
The next four models in Table 6 add independent variables that control for other 
factors that may impact academic growth.  Following Collins and Gan (2013), Model 2 
controls for a variety of student and classroom factors that might impact student 
academic growth.47  Three classroom-related factors are worth discussing in detail.  
Approximately half of our observations are of students in classrooms that were created 
via between-class ability grouping.  Experiencing between-class ability grouping may 
have an impact independent from the classroom dispersion mechanism, so we control for 
that possibility.  We also control for class size because past research has shown that class 
size impacts growth (e.g. Word et al 1990; Angrist and Lavy 1999; Molnar et al. 1999).  
Lastly, we control for the average prior score in the classroom because there is a large 
and growing literature about the importance of peer effects for academic growth (e.g. 
                                                        
47 Unlike Collins and Gan (2013), we do not include independent variables for teacher experience or salary 
because we control directly for individual teacher effects.  Similarly, we do not control for average school 
scores or size because we control directly for individual school effects.  Our models include separate 
variables for free and reduced lunch status, while Collins and Gan (2013) combine these into one category.  
Our models do not control for gender or race, but including them leads to similar results (available upon 
request). 
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Sacerdote 2011; but for evidence against peer effects see Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2014).  
After controlling for all these factors, the coefficient on classroom dispersion is slightly 
higher and continues to be statistically significant (p-value < 0.001) – not at all the 
prediction of the literature. 
Model 3 includes all the covariates from Model 2 and adds prior Math score, a 
variable for which we have imperfect coverage.  The classroom dispersion coefficient is 
nearly identical; subsequent models do not include prior Math score in order to avoid 
losing observations.  Model 4 adds four types of fixed effects: grades, teachers, sites, and 
terms (i.e. the four trimesters).  Adding these fixed effects shrinks the coefficient on 
classroom dispersion by half, but it remains positive and significant.   
Table 6: OLS Models of Academic Growth 
Model 
1. Basic OLS 
Model 
2. Add 
Student and 
Class Factors 
3. Add Prior 
Math Score 
4. All but 
Student 
Control 
5. Student 
Control 
Classroom 
Dispersion 
0.437*** 
[0.063] 
0.676*** 
[0.069] 
0.569*** 
[0.067] 
0.261*** 
[0.100] 
0.377*** 
[0.085] 
Prior Score 
0.857*** 
[0.007] 
0.699*** 
[0.013] 
0.518*** 
[0.016] 
0.695*** 
[0.013] 
-0.177*** 
[0.020] 
Ability 
Grouping 
n/a 
1.275*** 
[0.371] 
0.257 
[0.363] 
-3.991*** 
[1.461] 
6.160 
[6.392] 
Student and 
Class Factors 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Prior Math No No Yes No No 
Grade, 
Teacher, 
School, & 
Term Controls 
No No No Yes Yes 
Student 
Control 
No No 
No 
No Yes 
Observations 4308 4308 4190 4308 4308 
Adjusted R2 0.766 0.776 0.793 0.794 0.882 
Notes: Outcome is current NWEA MAP scale score.  Student factors include dummy variables for being an 
English Learner, a student with a disability, a recipient of free lunch, and a recipient of reduced price lunch.  
Class factors include class size, average prior English score, and a dummy variable for ability grouping. 
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Model 5 includes all the variables in Model 4 and adds student fixed effects.  This 
means each student is being compared only to themselves in different trimesters, not to 
other students.  Model 5 measures the impact of differences in classroom dispersion that 
individual students experience from trimester to trimester.  Such a test of classroom 
dispersion is quite different than Models 1 through 4.  Impressively, the coefficient on 
classroom dispersion remains positive and significant; larger than Model 4, but not as 
large as Models 1 through 3.  Even this test of the relationship between classroom 
dispersion and academic growth defies the expectations of the literature. 
The contrast with the ability grouping dummy variable is stark.  That variable is 
statistically insignificant in two models, and has opposite signs in the other two models.  
It appears that between-class ability grouping did not have any effect beyond the 
classroom clustering mechanism. 
Given the nature of our data, mixed effects multilevel models are more 
appropriate than OLS regressions (Gelman and Hill 2007).  One reason is that multilevel 
models explicitly deal with the nested nature of our data.  Multilevel models can divide 
our observations into groups based on four nesting variables: terms (i.e. trimesters), 
followed by schools, followed by English teachers, followed by grades.  This creates 206 
groups with an average of 21 observations each.48  The other advantage is that multilevel 
models apply random effects for each of the four nesting variables.  This allows the 
intercept for academic growth to vary by each of those 206 groups. 
                                                        
48 The number of groups (206) is slightly less than the number of distinct English classes (234) because in 
the one trimester of 2017-18 data, departmentalization caused many elementary teachers to teach two 
English classes in the same grade.  
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 Table 7 shows the results of four multilevel models.  The first includes all the 
same variables as Model 4 in Table 6.  The difference is that while the OLS model 
includes the four nesting variables – term, school, teacher, and grade – as fixed effects, 
the multilevel model includes them as random effects.  The coefficient on classroom 
dispersion continues to be positive and statistically significant (p-value < 0.001), with a 
magnitude nearly identical to Models 4 and 5 from Table 6.  The second model in Table 7 
is identical to the first except for one change: it nests teachers within grades instead of the 
other way around.  Either approach leads to the same number of groups, and either 
approach is defensible; in some cases one English teacher spans multiple grades, while in 
other cases one grade contains multiple English teachers.  Since our data covers two 
school years, a number of teachers change what grade they teach.  Ultimately, this 
swayed us to use Model 1 as our main analysis, but it is reassuring that the coefficient for 
classroom dispersion is nearly identical in Model 2. 
Table 7: Multilevel Models of Academic Growth 
Model 
1. Random 
Effects, Grades 
within Teachers 
2. Random 
Effects, Teachers 
within Grades 
3. Fixed and 
Random Effects, 
Grades within 
Teachers 
4. Fixed and 
Random Effects, 
Grades within 
Teachers 
Classroom 
Dispersion 
0.391*** 
[0.108] 
0.349*** 
[0.106] 
0.203* 
[0.115] 
0.173 
[0.115] 
Ability 
Grouping 
1.474** 
[0.626] 
1.179* 
[0.696] 
-3.939** 
[1.950] 
-4.159** 
[1.976] 
Observations 4308 4308 4308 4308 
Log likelihood -15797 -15794 -15716 -15716 
Notes: All models are mixed-effects multilevel regressions.  Outcome is current NWEA MAP scale score.  
Models also include the following independent variables: prior English scale score, dummy variables for 
being an English Learner, a student with a disability, a recipient of free lunch, and a recipient of reduced 
price lunch, class size, and the class’ average prior English scale score. 
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 Models 3 and 4 in Table 7 mirror the first two but make one important change.  
They include the four nesting variables as fixed effects as well as random effects.  Doing 
so dramatically reduces the power of random effects.  This explains why the coefficients 
in these two closely match those in Model 4 of Table 6, an OLS model with fixed effects 
for our nesting variables.  The classroom dispersion coefficient drops slightly and even 
becomes statistically insignificant in Model 4.  Model 4 is one of the only analyses that 
does not find a positive and significant relationship between classroom dispersion and 
academic growth. 
 Table 8 looks for differences between important subsets of the data.49  All the 
models in this table use Model 1 from Table 7, which we will refer to this as our main 
analysis: a mixed-effects multilevel model with only random effects for the four nesting 
variables.  The first two columns of Table 8 separate students who were experiencing 
between-class ability grouping from students who were not.  Each of those groups 
happens to be almost exactly half the dataset, and they span all grades and schools.  The 
effect of classroom dispersion is similar for both groups, demonstrating that classroom 
dispersion is positively related to growth regardless of whether ability grouping is in 
place.  This is an important confirmation of our theory that the mechanism of classroom 
dispersion operates at all times, not just when between-class ability grouping is 
implemented. 
                                                        
49 Analyses by grade level (not reported) reveal similarly positive and significant effects for grades 1 and 2 
and 3 through 5.  However, the result for grades 6 through 8 is negative and significant.  This is based on 
719 observations, and 61% of those observations are from students taught at one middle school.  That 
middle school happened to experience turnover of English instructors during the 2016-17 school year.  
While it could be that classroom dispersion has a different impact in middle school grades than in other 
grades, there is no obvious theoretical reason to expect this to be the case.  Also, the factors mentioned 
above gives us reason to be suspicious of the relatively small amount of middle school data we have. 
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 Model 3 in Table 8 isolates term 4, the first trimester of the 2017-18 school year.  
As mentioned previously, several changes occurred at the start of this school year 
concerning the implementation of between-class ability grouping.  It is possible that these 
changes could alter the relationship between classroom dispersion and academic growth.  
However, Model 3 suggests the relationship remained unchanged: positive and 
significant.  We will update this analysis to confirm that this is still true when more data 
from 2017-18 is available.  Also, it is still possible that implementing between-class 
ability grouping in a different manner or context would result in a different coefficient for 
classroom dispersion.  However, the consistency of our results across these subsets of 
data suggest that at least in this context, there is a real relationship between classroom 
dispersion and academic growth.  
Table 8: Results by Ability Grouping and for Term 4 
Model 
1. Ability 
Grouping 
2. No Ability 
Grouping 
3. Only Term 4 
Classroom 
Dispersion 
0.327** 
[0.158] 
0.393** 
[0.170] 
0.347* 
[0.192] 
Ability 
Grouping 
n/a n/a 
0.677 
[1.325] 
Observations 2204 2104 1069 
Log likelihood -8098 -7685 -3860 
Notes:  All models are mixed-effects multilevel regressions that utilize random effects for grade, teacher, 
school, and term (i.e. Model 1 from Table 3).  Outcome is current NWEA MAP scale score. All models 
also include the following independent variables: prior English scale score, dummy variables for being an 
English Learner, a student with a disability, a recipient of free lunch, and a recipient of reduced price lunch, 
class size, and the class’ average prior English scale score. 
 In addition to overall academic growth, researchers and the public increasingly 
care about equity of outcomes across students.  Before concluding the analysis section, 
we therefore want to see if classroom dispersion impacts students differently depending 
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on their prior ability level.  Table 9 conducts the main analysis four times, once for each 
different quartile of prior English ability.  The first quartile is the lowest performing and 
the fourth quartile is the highest performing.  Every grade in the dataset was divided as 
closely into quartiles as possible.  The average national percentile is 9 for the first 
quartile, 32 for the second quartile, 53 for the third quartile, and 78 for the fourth quartile. 
The classroom dispersion coefficient for elementary grades are relatively 
consistent and always positive.  The coefficient is largest and significant for students in 
the third quartile, which appears to reflect the incentives facing these – and many other – 
schools.  The No Child Left Behind federal education law taught schools to measure their 
performance in terms of the percent of students who are at or above the standard for 
proficiency.  This is approximately the 60th national percentile, which is near the average 
for the third quartile of students in our sample.  Therefore, we would expect teachers and 
administrators to focus particularly on achieving academic growth with this third quartile.  
The more classroom dispersion there is, the more this focus is at the expense of other 
students.  There is a large negative coefficient on ability grouping for the third quartile 
because when ability grouping occurs, those third quartile students no longer receive the 
same focused attention from all teachers.  
Results for the first two quartiles reflect the opposite story.  Their coefficients for 
ability grouping are positive, and for the first quartile are significant.  This is most likely 
because between-class ability grouping allows these students to receive more focus than 
they would in a non-sorted class.  Therefore, ability grouping improves equity by 
enabling more teachers to focus on the lowest achieving students.  This part of our 
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hypothesized clustering mechanism appears to be true.  However, ability grouping 
reduces overall academic growth because of diminished growth among other students – 
especially those in the third quartile.  It is unclear why higher ability students do not 
similarly benefit from the clustering mechanism.  Whatever the reason, the result is that 
ability grouping leads to a more equitable, but slightly lower on average, distribution of 
academic performance. 
Table 9: Results by Grade Level and Student Ability 
 Quartile of Prior ELA Ability 
Quartile 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Classroom 
Dispersion 
0.160 
[0.210] 
0.211 
[0.189] 
0.360** 
[0.180] 
0.112 
[0.210] 
Ability 
Grouping 
3.313*** 
[1.071] 
0.892 
[1.036] 
-1.584 
[1.097] 
-0.849 
[1.181] 
Observations 1124 1094 1054 1036 
Log likelihood -4301 -4000 -3752 -3667 
Notes: All models are mixed-effects multilevel regressions that utilize random effects for grade, teacher, 
school, and term (i.e. Model 1 from Table 3).  Outcome is current NWEA MAP scale score. All models 
also include the following independent variables: prior English scale score, dummy variables for being an 
English Learner, a student with a disability, a recipient of free lunch, and a recipient of reduced price lunch, 
class size, and the class’ average prior English scale score. 
Conclusions and Implications 
The evidence from our sample shows that more classroom dispersion in prior 
ability increases academic growth.  This is exactly the opposite of what the recent 
literature would expect, and defies the null hypothesis of the traditional literature.  With a 
few small exceptions, the results for classroom dispersion are remarkably consistent 
across a variety of model specifications and subsets of the data.  In contrast, our ability 
grouping dummy variable has a wide range of positive and negative coefficients across 
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different models.  Therefore, between-class ability grouping does not appear to impact 
overall academic growth independent of the clustering mechanism. 
Why does between-class ability grouping decrease overall academic growth?  
While it is difficult to know for sure, the analysis in Table 5 does suggest a hypothesis.  
Ability grouping increased academic growth for students in the bottom quartile, but 
decreased growth for students in the top two quartiles.  In other words, teachers were able 
to make use of decreased classroom dispersion to help low-ability students, but not high-
ability students.  Perhaps teachers did not have the training or tools to push high-ability 
students especially quickly.  Since the No Child Left Behind Act in 2000, schools in the 
United States have been incentivized to help students get to proficiency, not any higher.  
This incentive will go away as states transition to accountability systems that value 
growth in all parts of the achievement spectrum.  Perhaps targeted professional 
development in this area would help teachers accelerate the growth of high-ability 
students. 
The fact that minimizing or maximizing classroom dispersion – a practice that is 
virtually free – could impact academic growth is noteworthy.  Additionally, the impact 
estimates are small but similar to other factors important to academic growth.  The 
difference between top and bottom quartile teachers is approximately 10% of a standard 
deviation (Kane and Staiger 2012).50  In our sample, implementing between-class ability 
                                                        
50 The Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) project rigorously evaluated the performance of nearly 3,000 
teachers.  It found that teacher performance is most accurately predicted by a combination of classroom 
observations, student surveys, and value added measures from standardized tests. 
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grouping decreases classroom dispersion by an average of one standard deviation.  That 
translates to an estimated 7% standard deviation decrease in academic growth. 
This paper advances the literature on between-class ability grouping by focusing 
on one mechanism: decreasing classroom dispersion in prior ability allows teachers to 
focus their instruction more narrowly.  When recent studies find a positive effect from 
ability grouping, they claim this mechanism explains their results (Duflo et al. 2011; 
Collins and Gan 2013).  Our finding does not support their claim.  This clash is likely 
because this paper studies a very different context.  Indeed, Duflo et al. (2011) readily 
admit that their analysis of Kenya may not generalize to developed countries such as the 
United States.  For Collins and Gan (2013), the difference may be caused by the change 
to Common Core standards.  Instead of memorization and recall, these standards 
emphasize reading comprehension and critical thinking.   
Of course, there may be factors specific to Fortune School of Education (FSE) 
that limit the generalizability of our findings.  As a network of charter schools, FSE has 
the ability to implement and tweak policies much more quickly than many school 
districts.  Additionally, FSE students are primarily low-income African-American and 
Latino, and their families had to choose to have their children attend these schools.  
Teachers tend to be relatively young, and both teacher and student turnover is relatively 
high.  These factors, either singly or in combination, could condition the way classroom 
dispersion impacts academic growth. 
It is also important to note that in some contexts, between-class ability grouping 
may affect academic growth through mechanisms besides this clustering mechanism.  In 
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an effect to detect this, we report the results of an ability group dummy variable for each 
analysis.  The coefficient on this variable is frequently insignificant, occasionally 
attaining significance in different directions in different model specifications.  This 
pattern suggests that at FSE, ability grouping did not have an impact on academic growth 
outside of the clustering mechanism. 
We therefore can conclude that ability grouping at FSE has not had a null effect, 
as the traditional literature would predict.  There are methodological reasons to trust our 
findings over that of the traditional literature.  We employ multilevel models in order to 
allow for random effects from grades, teachers, schools, and terms.  We test a variety of 
model specifications and find consistent, significant effects from classroom dispersion.  
We even find a similar effect when we control for student fixed effects. 
There is a possibility that when implemented in particular ways, between-class 
ability grouping could have an average effect beyond clustering students by prior ability.  
On the negative side, students may disengage if they feel that they are trapped in lower-
level classes.  On the positive side, allowing elementary teachers to “departmentalize” 
and teach only half of the subjects in their grade may eventually result in higher academic 
growth when this practice is combined with ability grouping.  Future research could look 
for these and other possible mechanisms linking between-class ability grouping to 
academic growth. 
Turning to implications for practitioners, there are two important sources of 
uncertainty.  One is about the generalizability of our findings: the relationship between 
classroom dispersion and academic growth may be influenced by the context of FSE.  
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The second source of uncertainty is about ways of implementing ability grouping: there 
could be other mechanisms by which ability grouping could influence academic growth.  
Given these issues, the best course of action is for school leaders focused on overall 
academic growth to be cautious about adopting between-class ability grouping and to test 
its impact in their specific context. 
However, we care about both growth and equity.  Our findings suggest that while 
maximizing dispersion would boost overall academic growth in elementary grades, it 
would do so primarily by helping students in the middle of the distribution.  In contrast, 
between-class ability grouping would boost growth for students in the bottom half – and 
especially the bottom quartile – of the distribution, while decreasing growth for higher-
ability students.  In other words, ability grouping would make a school’s scores more 
equitable, but at a cost of approximately 7% of a standard deviation in overall academic 
growth.  There is no easy way to reconcile tradeoffs between the important values of 
equity and overall growth.  Ideally we will find less costly ways to help the lowest-ability 
students catch up to their peers. 
Perhaps there is a way to implement between-class ability grouping that has an 
overall positive impact in elementary grades.  It is possible that specific curricula or 
professional development could change the relationship between classroom dispersion 
and academic growth.  Maybe with additional training on how to push a higher ability 
classroom, teachers could help top quartile students benefit from ability grouping as 
much as bottom quartile students.  This could allow between-class ability grouping to 
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improve both equity and overall academic growth in elementary schools.  Hopefully 
researchers and practitioners will work together to find such a solution soon. 
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APPENDIX A 
The 2014-15 data for LAUSD is either zero or redacted, with just four 
exceptions.51  Supplemental manual data collection allows us to obtain exact suspension 
rates for all but 83 LAUSD schools.52  This reveals that the 83 remaining schools have an 
average of 1.5 suspensions each.53 
There is a bit more uncertainty about the number of suspensions in 2012-13.  Data 
files contain exact information for schools that report either zero or more than ten 
suspensions based on defiance for all subgroups.  The more difficult cases are schools 
where some or all of their suspension data is redacted: 459 redacted data points account 
for 1166 suspensions.  Manual data collection allows us to know the exact number of 
suspensions – totaling 674 – for another 107 LAUSD schools.  The 204 schools with one 
redacted subgroup therefore share the remaining 492 suspensions (1166 minus 674) – an 
average of 2.4 suspensions each.  The larger number of schools with unknown suspension 
counts (204 vs. 83) combined with those schools’ higher average number of suspensions 
(2.4 vs. 1.5) results in a little more uncertainty surrounding the estimates for 2012-13 
than for 2014-15. 
                                                        
51 Four LAUSD schools – only one included in the analysis, Edwin Markham Middle – had at least one 
subgroup with over ten suspensions based on defiance in 2014-15, for a combined total of 75 suspensions.  
Subtracting these 75 suspensions from the 305 we know occurred district-wide leaves 230 possible 
suspensions. 
52 Schoolwide suspension counts are only available from individual school pages a state website (not in a 
dataset format), and it is redacted whenever reporting it would reveal a redacted subgroup.  Looking up 
each of the twenty-one schools that had two or three redacted subgroups allows us to explain 106 of the 
remaining 230 suspensions that occurred district-wide (see above footnote). 
53 The remaining 124 suspensions must be spread across eighty-three schools that have only one redacted 
subgroup each.  While it is possible that a very small number of these schools have up to ten suspensions, 
mathematical constraints assure us that the vast majority of these school have only one or two. 
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The uncertainty motivates us to measure “change in suspension rate” categorically 
rather than continuously.  Replacing unknown redacted data with the average number of 
suspensions per subgroup would allow us to estimate a continuous variable, but this 
measure would contain errors for schools with unknown redacted data.  One approach 
uses those estimated suspension rates to place LAUSD middle schools into one of one of 
four categories: 
1. Increased suspension rate (12 schools) 
2. Maintained suspension rate (25 schools) 
3. Decreased suspension rate <=1% (44 schools) 
4. Decreased suspension rate >1% (13 schools) 
For 13 LAUSD schools in our sample, we are uncertain whether they experienced an 
increase or decrease in suspensions because they had one redacted subgroup in one year 
and between 1 and 10 suspensions in the other year.  We run robustness tests without 
these schools and find very similar results. 
There is significant overlap between this categorization and the one (in the paper) 
based on the number of suspensions given in 2013.  All but 1 of the 13 schools that 
decreased suspension rates more than 1% had at least eleven suspensions in 2013.  All 
but 3 of the 44 schools that decreased 1% or less had fewer than eleven suspensions in 
2013.  All 25 schools that had no change in suspension rate had no suspensions in 2013.  
The main difference is that the first categorization identifies and groups the 12 schools 
that experienced increases in suspension rates; 6 had one redacted subgroup (i.e. probably 
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one or two suspensions), five had between two and twelve reported suspensions, and one 
had thirty-five suspensions in 2013. 
To test hypothesis three, we conduct analyses of schools within LAUSD.  The 
two strands of the literature predict that the decrease (or increase) in academic growth 
should be correlated to the decrease in suspension rate.  Figure 12 shows a non-linear 
relationship between suspensions and growth.  Schools that maintained a suspension rate 
saw an increase in academic growth.  Schools with a decrease of 1% or less had a 22% 
drop in growth.  Schools with at least a 1% decrease in suspension rate experienced a 
decrease approximately half the size: 10% of a standard deviation.  The pattern for these 
three right-hand columns does not perfectly fit either strand of the literature, but it is 
closer to the one that predicts suspension bans harm academic growth. 
Figure 12: Change in Academic Growth by Change in Suspension Rate 
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The largest decrease – 29% of a standard deviation – was among the dozen 
schools that had an increase in suspension rate.  Four of these schools had 0 defiance 
suspensions in 2013, seven of them had between 1 and 10, and one school had 40.  
Although this finding is not driven by a particular outlying school, evidence does not 
suggest that giving more suspensions in 2015 caused this academic decline.  Most of 
these schools had extremely small changes in suspension rate, and the five schools with 
changes above 0.2% experienced almost no change in academic growth (-5%).  
Additionally, it is noteworthy that these twelve schools had the lowest 2013 growth rate 
of all the groups of LAUSD schools we analyze, as shown in Table 10.  This suggests a 
different explanation: that at least some of these schools had other problems which led to 
both their non-compliance with the suspension ban and a further decrease in their 
academic growth rate. 
Table 10: Academic Growth Rates by Change in Suspension Rate 
 Academic Growth 
2011 to 2013 
Academic Growth 
2013 to 2015 
Increased Suspension Rate -21% -51% 
Maintained Suspension Rate 5% 13% 
Decreased Suspension Rate 1% or Less -10% -32% 
Decreased Suspension Rate More than 1% -9% -21% 
Note: Academic growth rates are reported in standard deviation units. 
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